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Case No. 20080480-SC
IN THE

UTAH SUPREME COURT
State of Utah,
Plaintiff/ Appellant,
vs.

Gareth Bozung,
Defendant/ Appellee.

Brief of Appellant
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The State appeals from the dismissal of charges of distribution of a controlled
substance, a first degree felony; possession of a controlled substance, a second
degree felony; possession of drug paraphernalia in a drug-free zone, a class B
misdemeanor; and obstruction of justice, a class A misdemeanor. This Court has
jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78A-3-102(3)(i) (West Supp. 2008).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1.

Where Defendant was experienced in the criminal justice system,

volunteered to read his Miranda rights to himself rather than have them given
orally, completed an Admonition of Rights Form, and then confirmed that he
understood his rights, did the trial court err in ruling that Defendant was not

adequately advised of his Miranda rights merely because he talked about extraneous
issues while he completed the Form?
Preservation. This issue was preserved by the State's opposition to
Defendant's motion to suppress. R. 54-50; R. 113:passim; R. HV.passim.
Standard of Review. This Court "review[s] for correctness a trial court's
ultimate ruling regarding the validity of a Miranda waiver, while 'granting some
degree of discretion to the trial court because of the wide variety of factual settings
possible/" State v. Bybee, 2000 UT 43, f 16,1 P.3d 1087 (quoting State v. Dutchie, 969
P.2d 422,427 (Utah 1998) (citation omitted)). Such discretion is limited, however,
where, as here, a recording of the defendant's custodial interrogation is included in
the record, since this Court then "stands in the same position as the trial court in
reviewing the [recording] of the interrogation," State v. Gutierrez, 864 P.2d 894,898
(Utah App. 1983). This Court "review[s] for clear error the trial court's findings of
fact underlying the waiver." Id.
2.

Did the trial court err in denying the State's timely pretrial motion to

briefly reopen the suppression hearing, where the State omitted, but did not
purposefully withhold, crucial evidence at the initial hearing?
Preservation. This issue was preserved by the State's written motion to reopen
the suppression hearing and the trial court's denial thereof. R. 70-69; R. 122:3-9. To
the extent the issue was not preserved, the State argues plain error.
2

Standard of Review. Whether the trial court applied the correct legal standard
in denying a timely pretrial motion to reopen a suppression hearing is a question of
law reviewed for correctness. See State v. Bisner, 2001 UT 99, f 31, 37 P.3d 1073.
Otherwise, a trial court's denial of a motion to reopen is reviewed for abuse of
discretion. See Ross v. Leftwich, 14 Utah 2d 71,377 P.2d 495,497 (1963).
"To demonstrate plain error, [appellant] must establish that (i) an error exists;
(ii) the error should have been obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the error is
harmful, i.e., absent the error, there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable
outcome for the appellant." State v. Dean, 2004 UT 63, f 15,95 P.3d 276 (citations and
internal quotation marks omitted).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
The following provisions, relevant to this appeal, are attached at Addendum
A: United States Const. Amend. V; Utah R. Crim. P. 24.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
and
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On March 9,2007, at 11:21 p.m., Joshua Ruzicka was found dead from a drug
overdose in Highland, Utah. R. 54; R. 126:13:46:50. At the time, Mr. Ruzicka had
heroin, cocaine, and morphine in his blood. R. 54. Defendant found Mr. Ruzicka
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and called the police to report his death. R. 54; R. 126:13:48:55-49:06. Police officers
spoke with Defendant at the scene but did not detain him. R. 54.
On May 1,2007, Defendant was arrested on unrelated drug charges. R. 113:7.
In connection with that arrest, Defendant was transported to the Lehi Police
Department. Id.
While at the police station, Defendant met with Detective Moosman about Mr.
Ruzicka's death. R. 113:12; R. 126 (video of Defendant's interview attached at
Addendum B). Defendant and Detective Moosman had already discussed Mr.
Ruzicka's death on several occasions. R. 126:13:37:46-13:37:50.
After Defendant and Detective Moosman greeted each other, Defendant
began to tell the detective about his recent travails, primarily a fight with his mother
and an accusation by his stepmother that he had taken some of her prescription
drugs. R. 126:13:36:12-37:46.
Detective Moosman then told Defendant that they were there to talk about
Mr. Ruzicka's death again. R. 126:13:37:46. Detective Moosman explained that,
because Defendant had just been arrested, Detective Moosman had to "go through"
Defendant's rights with him. R. 126:13:38:02.
Detective Moosman took out an Admonition of Rights Form and put it in
front of Defendant. R. 126:13:38:04. The Form stated:

4

Before we ask you any questions, you must understand your
rights. Those rights are:
You have the right to remain silent.
If you give up the right to remain silent, anything you say
can and will be used against you in a court of law.
You have the right to speak with an attorney and to have
the attorney present during questioning.
If you so desire and cannot afford one, an attorney will be
appointed for you without charge before questioning.
If you decide to answer questions now without a
lawyer/attorney present, you will still have the right to stop
answering questions at any time. You also have the right to stop
answering at any time until you have talked to a
lawyer/ attorney.
WAIVER OF RIGHTS
I have been "warned" regarding my rights and have read the
above statement regarding my rights. I understand what my
rights are. I am willing to make a statement and answer
questions. I do not want a lawyer at this time. I understand and
know what I am doing. No promises or threats have been made
to me and no pressure or coercion of any kind has been used
against me.
R. 128 (attached at Addendum C).
Detective Moosman began to read from the Admonition of Rights Form that
Defendant had the right to remain silent. R. 126:13:38:07. Detective Moosman asked
Defendant whether he understood that right, and Defendant responded, "yeah." R.
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126:13:38:09. Detective Moosman asked Defendant if he would initial the Form
beside that right. R. 126:13:38:12.
Then, looking back over his shoulder, Defendant said, "I can just read it, he
just read me my rights." R. 126:13:38:12. Detective Moosman said that was fine and
asked Defendant "if you'll read and just initial by them." R. 126:13:38:14-38:20.
Over the next two minutes, Defendant looked at the Form and moved his pen
from left to right across the page, stopping periodically to place his initials on the
page. R. 126:13:38:12-13:39:04. As he did so, Defendant continued to talk with
Detective Moosman about extraneous matters. Id. At times, Defendant would look
at Detective Moosman while he talked, and then return to the Form. Id.
After Defendant placed his initials beside each right on the Form, Detective
Moosman asked Defendant to read the next section and initial it. R. 126:13:39:05. As
Defendant continued to talk about other matters, he looked down at the
Admonition of Rights Form and again moved his pen back and forth across the
page. When Defendant finished reading, Detective Moosman told Defendant where
to initial and then, after Defendant had moved his pen through the next section,
Detective Moosman told Defendant where to sign. R. 126:13:39:05-13:40:15.
Detective Moosman asked Defendant whether he understood "all this stuff";
Defendant responded, "yup." R. 126:13:40:15.
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Detective Moosman told Defendant that, if he understood and agreed with it,
he should sign the form at the bottom "and then I'll sign as a witness/'

R.

126:13:40:16-40:23. After Defendant signed the form, the detective also signed it. R.
126:13:40:23-40:42.
Defendant showed no reservation about talking with Detective Moosman
concerning what happened on the night Mr. Ruzicka died. R. 126:13:40:48.
Defendant admitted that he and Mr. Ruzicka had both bought drugs that night. He
admitted that he had several balloons of heroine on him that night and that he was
selling it at the time. He admitted that he sold Mr. Ruzicka a balloon of heroine on
the day Mr. Ruzicka died. He admitted that he and Mr. Ruzicka used drugs that
night. He admitted that he had paraphernalia with him that night. And he
admitted that he had moved a bong out of Mr. Ruzicka's room into another room
before emergency personnel arrived. R. 126:13:41:14-14:01:03.
Detective Moosman then asked Defendant to give him a written statement. R.
126:14:02:50. Detective Moosman provided Defendant with a form and began by
asking Defendant to fill in his name, address and telephone number at the top of the
form.

R. 126:14:02:50-14:04:00.

Defendant continued to talk with Detective

Moosman as he completed the top of the form. R. 126:14:04:00-14:07:48. Detective
Moosman then asked Defendant to read the next paragraph—which warned that his
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statement could be used in lieu of his testimony — out loud. R. 126:14:07:38-07:42.
Defendant read the paragraph out loud without a problem. R. 126:14:07:44-08:06.
Defendant spent about 45 minutes completing his written statement, reading
it aloud as he went. R. 126:14:10:31-14:56:35. The interview lasted slightly more
than 80 minutes. R. 126.
Based on his interview with Detective Moosman, Defendant was charged
with one count each of distribution of a controlled substance, a first degree felony;
possession of a controlled substance, a second degree felony; possession of drug
paraphernalia in a drug-free zone, a class B misdemeanor; amd obstruction of justice,
a class A misdemeanor. R. 2-1. Following a preliminary hearing, Defendant was
bound over on all counts. R. 31-30.
Defendant then filed a motion to suppress the statements he made during his
interview with Detective Moosman, asserting that the detective had failed to
adequately advise him of his Miranda rights. R. 39-37. At the evidentiary hearing
that followed, the trial court received both a copy of Defendant's interview with
Detective Moosman and a copy of the Admonition of Rights Form Defendant
completed before that interview. R. 113:6-15 (transcript attached at Addendum D).
The Admonition of Rights Form showed that Defendant had initialed beside each
paragraph identifying his Miranda rights and beside the paragraph addressing his
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waiver of those rights. R. 128. The Form also included Defendant's signature under
the waiver paragraph. Id.
Detective Moosman was the only witness called at the hearing. R. 113:6-15.
The State presented no evidence concerning the initial Miranda warnings Defendant
received from the arresting officers just prior to his interview with Detective
Moosman. Id. At the close of evidence, the court set the matter for argument.
At the next hearing, the parties first addressed Defendant's sentencing in
three other pending cases and, in the process, acknowledged that Defendant had a
prior felony conviction. R. 121:4-9 (transcript attached at Addendum E). The court
then heard argument on Defendant's motion to suppress. R. 121:9.
At the close of argument, the trial court orally granted Defendant's motion. R.
76; R. 121:24. In its written order, the trial court found it was "unable to determine.
.. in what sequence Defendant initialed the various places where his initials appear
on the form, or whether Defendant actually read the various admonitions on the
form, much less whether Defendant comprehended any of the admonitions.,, R. 82
(attached at Addendum F). The court then found that that "Defendant did not focus
exclusively on the admonitions written on the" Admonition of Rights Form and that
"Defendant was distracted from the admonitions on the form by the matters about
which he spoke with Det. Moosman." Id. Consequently, the court concluded that it
was "not persuaded... that Defendant, by his own reading of the written waiver of
9

rights form, was adequately advised" of his Miranda righs. R. 81. Moreover,
because the court could not "determine from the evidence [whether]... Defendant
was in fact previously advised of his Miranda rights, who so advised him, whether
such admonitions were adequately recited to Defendant... or whether Defendant
voluntarily and knowingly waived [them]," the court concluded that it was "not
persuaded . . . that prior to the interview by Detective Moosman, Defendant had
been adequately advised of his Miranda rights [or] that Defendant voluntarily and
knowingly waived each of such rights." Id.
Two days after the court issued its oral ruling, the State filed a Motion for
Rehearing on Suppression Motion, asking the trial court to reopen the evidentiary
hearing to permit the State to "present evidence from the Lehi police officers who
read the Defendant his Miranda rights" just minutes prior to Detective Moosman's
review of those rights with Defendant. R. 70-69. Defendant objected to the State's
motion. R. 73-71.
At a hearing that followed, the trial court opined that the State's motion
constituted an attempt to get "a second bite at the apple." R. 122:4 (transcript
attached at Addendum G). The court then ruled that, because neither the rules of
criminal procedure nor the rules of civil procedure specifically provide for motions
for rehearing, rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure was "[t]he most
closely appropriate rule . . . that would govern the State's [m]otion." R. 88-86
10

(attached at Addendum H). And the court ruled that under rule 24, a party seeking
a new trial based on additional evidence must show that the new evidence "'could
not with reasonable diligence have been discovered and produced at the trial.'" Id.
(quoting State v. James, 819 P.2d 781, 793 (Utah 1991)). The court then denied the
State's motion, ruling that the evidence the State sought to admit did not qualify as
newly discovered evidence. Id.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Point I. The trial court erred in granting Defendant's motion to suppress his
interview with Detective Moosman. According to the trial court, because Defendant
was distracted when he completed the Admonition of Rights Form, the evidence
was insufficient to establish that his completion of the Form adequately advised him
of his Miranda rights. Thus, according to the court, the record did not support the
conclusion that Defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his Miranda rights.
Whether a defendant's waiver of his Miranda rights is valid "has two distinct
dimensions." First, the waiver must be voluntary "in the sense that it was the
product of a free and deliberate choice rather than intimidation, coercion, or
deception." Second, the waiver must be knowing and intelligent, i.e., made "with a
full awareness both of the nature of the right[s] being abandoned and the
consequences of the decision to abandon [them]." So long as "the 'totality of the
circumstances surrounding the interrogation' reveal both an uncoerced choice and
11

the requisite level of comprehension/' a defendant's waiver of his Miranda rights is
valid. Thus, the defendant need not be in an "optimal mental state" when the
warnings are given. Rather, he need only be "able to understand his important, yet
relatively simple Miranda rights."
In this case, the trial court concluded that, because Defendant continued to
talk with Detective Moosman about extraneous issues while he completed the
Admonition of Rights Form, the record did not establish that Defendant understood
the rights he was reading. In reaching that conclusion, however, the trial court failed
to properly consider the totality of the circumstances surrounding Defendant's
completion of the Form. Although that totality of circumstances does include
Defendant's being distracted while he was completing the Admonition of Rights
Form, it also includes Defendant's extensive prior experience with the criminal
justice system, his intelligence and ability to read, his attentiveness to the
Admonition of Rights Form as he completed it, his appearing to have read the Form
as he completed it, and his confirmation to Detective Moosman afterwards that he
understood his rights. This totality of circumstances contradicts the trial court's
conclusion that Defendant's completion of the Admonition of Rights Form was
inadequate to inform him of "his important, yet relatively simple Miranda rights."
Point II. The trial court erred when it applied the newly discovered evidence
standard applicable to new trials to the State's motion to reopen the suppression
12

hearing. Under the appropriate standard, the trial court should have granted the
State's motion, where the missing evidence was crucial to deciding whether
Defendant's waiver of his Miranda rights was valid and nothing in the record
suggested that the State had purposefully withheld the evidence from the first
hearing.
Point II. A. The trial court committed plain error when it ruled that the
newly discovered evidence standard governing motions for new trial under rule 24
also governs pretrial motions to reopen suppression hearings. First, the court erred
in applying rule 24 to the State's motion because, by its terms, rule 24 applies to
post-judgment motions for new trial. This was a pretrial motion to reopen a
suppression hearing. Second, the court's error should have been obvious because
Utah case law has consistently granted trial courts broad discretion to grant prejudgment motions to reopen evidentiary hearings.

Utah law contains no

requirement that this type of motion be based on newly discovered evidence. It
was, therefore, obvious error to impose such a requirement here. Finally, the court's
error was prejudicial because the court's denial of the State's motion to reopen
precluded the State from pursuing serious criminal charges against Defendant
despite a constitutionally-obtained confession.
Point ILB. Under the proper standard, the trial court should have
granted the State's motion to reopen. This Court has consistently held that a trial
13

court has broad discretion when deciding whether to reopen evidentiary matters
before final judgment. This Court has also held that a court's discretion to reopen
evidentiary hearings should "be liberally exercised in behalf of allowing the whole
case to be presented" and "prevent[ing] a miscarriage of justice/7 It should not be
exercised "in a capricious and arbitrary manner which produces an inequitable or
unjust result,
In this case, the trial court's grant of Defendant's suppression motion
precluded the State from pursuing serious criminal charges against him. Yet, the
State had crucial evidence to challenge the trial court's ruling, and nothing in the
record suggests that the State purposefully withheld that evidence at the initial
suppression hearing.
On the other side of the balance, the costs of reopening the suppression
hearing would have been slight. Nothing in the record suggests that reopening the
suppression hearing would have unduly prejudiced Defendant or interfered with
the trial court's resources or docket.
Under such circumstances, the trial court should have granted the State's
timely pretrial motion to reopen to "allow[] the whole case to be presented" and to
avoid the "inequitable and unjust result" of precluding the State from prosecuting
Defendant for serious crimes despite a constitutionally-obtained confession.
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ARGUMENT
I.
WHERE DEFENDANT WAS EXPERIENCED WITH THE
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM, VOLUNTEERED TO READ HIS
MIRANDA RIGHTS HIMSELF FROM THE ADMONITION OF
RIGHTS FORM, COMPLETED THE FORM, AND THEN
CONFIRMED THAT HE UNDERSTOOD HIS RIGHTS, THE
TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT DEFENDANT WAS
NOT ADEQUATELY ADVISED OF HIS MIRANDA RIGHTS
MERELY BECAUSE HE TALKED ABOUT EXTRANEOUS
ISSUES WHILE HE COMPLETED THE FORM
The trial court erred in granting Defendant's suppression motion based on its
conclusion that Defendant was not adequately advised of his Miranda rights before
his interview with Detective Moosman. First, the court's finding that it was "unable
to determine . . . whether Defendant actually read the various admonitions on the
form, much less whether Defendant comprehended any of the admonitions" is
contrary to the clear weight of the evidence.

Second, the totality of the

circumstances—including Defendant's prior experience with the criminal justice
system, his intelligence and ability to read, his completion of a Notice of Rights
Form, and his acknowledgment to Detective Moosman that he understood his
rights — do not support the trial court's conclusion. Thus, the trial court's ruling on
Defendant's suppression motion should be reversed.
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A. Governing law.
"The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides that no
person 'shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.'"
Colorado v. Spring, 479 U.S. 564, 572 (1987). To protect that right, before any
custodial interrogation, "the [defendant] must be warned that he has a right to
remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used as evidence against
him, and that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or
appointed." Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436,444 (1966).
"There is," however, "no requirement as to the precise manner in which
police communicate [these Miranda] warnings to one suspected of crime.'" United
States v. Osterburg, 423 F.2d 704,705 (9th Cir. 1970) (quoting Bell v. United States, 382
F.2d 985,987 (9th Cir. 1967)); see also United States v. Alexander, 441 F.2d 403,404 (3rd
Cir. 1971) (per curiam); State v. Fisher, 556 A.2d 596,598 (Conn. 1989); State v. Strobel,
596 S.E.2d 249,253 (N.C. App. 2004).
Consequently, "it is not essential that the warnings required by Miranda . . .
be given in oral rather than written form." United States v. Sledge, 546 F.2d 1120,
1122 (4th Cir. 1977); see also United States v. Coleman, 524 F.2d 593, 594 (10th Cir.
1975) (per curiam); United States v. Bailey, 468 F.2d 652, 659-60 (5th Cir. 1972);
Alexander, 441 F.2d at 404; United States v. Van Dusen, 431 F.2d 1278,1280 (1st Cir.
1970); United States v. Johnson, 426 F.2d 1112,1115 (7th Cir. 1970); Osterburg, 423 F.2d
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at 705; Fisher, 556 A.2d at 598; State v. Roman, 983 So.2d 731,737 (Fla. App. Ct. 2008);
Commonwealth v. Day, 444 N.E.2d 384,386 n.8 (Mass. 1983); Strobel, 596 S.E.2d at 253;
State v. Apleton, 459 A.2d 94, 96 (R.I. 1983).
Once warnings are given, a defendant may waive his Miranda rights,
"provided the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently." Miranda,
384 U.S. at 444. A waiver is voluntary if "it was the product of a free and deliberate
choice rather than intimidation, coercion, or deception." Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S.
412, 421 (1986). A waiver is knowing and intelligent if it was "made with a full
awareness of both the nature of the right[s] being abandoned and the consequences
of the decision to abandon [them]." Id. "[I]f the 'totality of the circumstances
surrounding the interrogation' reveal both an uncoerced choice and the requisite
level of comprehension," a court may properly conclude that the waiver is valid.
"An express written or oral statement of waiver... is usually strong proof of
the validity of that waiver." North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369,373 (1979). "[A]
waiver of a suspect's rights 'may [also] be inferred from his acknowledgment of his
understanding of his rights and his subsequent course of conduct.'" State v. Leyva,
951 P.2d 738, 744 (Utah 1997) (quoting State v. Hegelman, 717 P.2d 1348,1349 (Utah
1986)); accord Butler, 441 U.S. at 373; State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 940 (Utah 1994).
Thus, courts "look at the totality of the circumstances to determine if a suspect
has a made a valid waiver.'" Leyva, 951 P.2d at 744 (quoting Hegelman, 717 P.2d at
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1349); accord State v. Strain, 779 P.2d 221, 224 (Utah 1989). Such circumstances
include '"the particular facts and circumstances surrounding the case, including the
background, experience, and conduct of the accused." State v. Moore, 697 P.2d 233,
236 (Utah 1985) (quoting Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039,1046 (1983)).
Relevant circumstances, therefore, include the defendant's "intelligence and
education, age and familiarity with the criminal justice system, [and] the proximity
of the waiver to the giving of the Miranda warnings." Correll v. Tliompson, 63 F.3d
1279,1288 (4th Cir. 1995) (citation omitted); see also State v. Dutchie, 969 P.2d 422,427
(Utah 1998).
Relevant circumstances also include the defendant's "ability to comprehend
the meaning and effect of his statement," as well as "questions of duress, threats,
promises or other coercion." Dutchie, 969 P.2d at 427. In assessing a defendant's
"ability to comprehend the meaning and effect of his statement," id., however, the
defendant need not be "completely mentally healthy at the time of the interview" or
be "thinking as clearly as he could have been." State v. Bybee, 2000 UT 43, f 27,1
P.3d 1087. The inquiry "is not whether [the defendant] was in an optimal mental
state, but whether he was able to understand his important, yet relatively simple
Miranda rights." Id.
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B. Defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his Miranda
rights.
In this case, "the record is devoid of any suggestion that police resorted to
physical or psychological pressure to elicit [Defendant's] statements," Burbine, 475
U.S. at 422. Thus, "[t]he voluntariness of [Defendant's] waiver is not at issue." Id.
Rather, the only question is whether the trial court properly concluded Defendant
was not sufficiently advised of his Miranda rights to render his waiver knowing and
intelligent. It did not.
First, Defendant had extensive prior experience with the criminal justice
system before he received his Miranda warnings from Detective Moosman. While
Defendant's motion to suppress was pending in this case, the same trial court had
before it at least three other criminal cases involving Defendant. See R. 121:3-6. In
addition, Defendant had a prior conviction in 2002 to a second degree felony drug
offense. R. 127:28, 29; R. 121:3-6.
Second, Defendant's interactions with Detective Moosman before he was
given his rights reveals that Defendant was an intelligent and articulate man able to
both understand and respond appropriately to questions asked of him.

R.

126:passim.
Third, Defendant's offer to read his Miranda rights from the Admonition of
Rights Form rather than have them read to him indicates that Defendant had the
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ability to read. And Defendant's ability was confirmed later in the interview when
Detective Moosman asked him to read a paragraph from another form out loud and
when, as Defendant completed his written statement, he read it aloud as he wrote.
R. 126:14:07:48; R. 126:14:10:00-31:00.
Finally, and most importantly, Defendant completed the Admonition of
Rights Form, which set forth Defendant's Miranda rights. R. 128. And the record
reveals that, although Defendant talked with Detective Moosman about extraneous
things while reviewing the Form, he was attentive to the Form as he completed it.
In addition, the record reveals that Defendant did not merely initial the Form
blindly. To the contrary, Defendant could be seen dragging his pen back and forth
across each of the paragraphs on the Form-as one would do if he were reading itbefore initialing them. R. I26:passim. Moreover, after Defendant had initialed by his
rights, Detective Moosman asked Defendant, "Do you understand all this stuff?" R.
126:13:40:15. Defendant responded, "Yup." R. 126:13:40:15. And, lastly, when
Detective Moosman then asked Defendant that, if he "understand[s] and agree[s]
with it, sign right there and then Til sign as a witness/' Defendant completed the
waiver portion of the Form with his signature and then showed no hesitation in
talking with Detective Moosman about Mr. Ruzicka's death. R. 126:13:40:16-40:26.
This totality of circumstances does not support the trial court's conclusion
that Defendant was not adequately advised of his Miranda rights. To reach that
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conclusion on this evidence, the trial court had to not only ignore Defendant's prior
experience with the criminal justice system, but also find that Defendant was
pretending to read the Admonition of Rights Form when he really was not and find
that Defendant was lying when he told Detective Moosman that he understood "all
this stuff/7 The requirement that the court consider the totality of the circumstances,
however, does not permit the court to ignore Defendant's prior experience with the
criminal justice system. And nothing in the record —other than the fact that
Defendant talked with Detective Moosman when he completed the Admonition of
Rights Form—supports findings that Defendant was only pretending to read the
Form as he dragged his pen back and forth across the page or that Defendant was
lying when he told the detective he understood the information on the Form.
In sum, "[w]hen someone with . . . extensive experience with the criminal
justice system... demonstrates an ability to read, and appears to read his Miranda
rights, those circumstances constitute 'strong proof that the waiver and the
subsequent statement were voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently given/' Fisher,
556 A.2d at 599 (citation omitted). Similarly," [a]n express written or oral statement
of waiver... is usually strong proof of the validity of that waiver/7 Butler, 441 U.S.
at 373. And, finally, a waiver "'may [also] be inferred from [a defendant's]
acknowledgement of his understanding of his rights and his subsequent course of
conduct." Leyva, 951 P.2d at 744 (citation omitted).
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In this case, Defendant had extensive experience with the criminal justice
system prior to his interview with Detective Moosman. In addition, he both
demonstrated an ability to read and appeared to have read his Miranda rights prior
to the interview. He then indicated to Detective Moosman that he understood those
rights, completed an express written waiver of those rights, and revealed no
hesitation in talking with Detective Moosman about Mr. Ruzicka's death.
This totality of the circumstances supports the conclusion that Defendant was
adequately advised of his Miranda rights before he waived them. Thus, the trial
court erred when it granted Defendant's suppression motion based on its conclusion
that Defendant was not adequately advised of those rights.
II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE STATE'S
TIMELY PRETRIAL MOTION TO REOPEN THE SUPPRESSION
HEARING, WHERE THE STATE OMITTED BUT DID NOT
PURPOSEFULLY WITHHOLD, CRUCIAL EVIDENCE AT THE
INITIAL HEARING
The trial court committed plain error when it applied the standard governing
post-judgment motions for new trial under rule 24, Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure, to the State's timely pretrial motion to briefly reopen the suppression
hearing. Under the appropriate standard, the trial court should have granted the
State's motion.
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A. The trial court committed plain error in ruling that rule 24, which
governs post-judgment motions for new trial, governed the State's
timely pretrial motion to briefly reopen the suppression hearing.
Before the trial court, the State did not challenge the court's ruling that rule
24, of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, governed the State's timely pretrial
motion to reopen the suppression hearing. R. 122:5. Thus, to prevail on appeal, the
State must demonstrate that the trial court committed plain error when it ruled that
rule 24 governed the State's motion.
'To demonstrate plain error, [the appellant] must establish that (i) an error
exists; (ii) the error should have been obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the error is
harmful, i.e., absent the error, there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable
outcome for the appellant/' State v. Dean, 2004 UT 63, Tf 15,95 P.3d 276 (citations and
internal quotation marks omitted).
In this case, the trial court erred in applying the newly discovered evidence
standard under rule 24 to the State's motion because, by its terms, rule 24 applies
only to post-judgment motions for new trial filed, not to pretrial motions to reopen
evidentiary hearings filed before trial. Second, the court's error should have been
obvious because Utah courts have consistently held that trial courts have broad
discretion to reopen pre-judgment evidentiary hearings, regardless of whether the
evidence sought to be presented is newly discovered. Finally, the court's error was
prejudicial because its failure to reopen the evidentiary hearing precluded the State
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from pursuing serious criminal charges against Defendant despite an admissible
confession.
Error. The trial court erred in ruling that Rule 24, Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure, governs timely pretrial motions to reopen suppression hearings.
Rule 24 governs post-judgment motions for new trial. Under the rule, a trial
court "may, upon motion of a party or upon its own initiative, grant a new trial in
the interest of justice if there is any error or impropriety which had a substantial
adverse effect upon the rights of a party/7 Utah R. Crim. P. 24(a). Under the rule, a
court may grant a motion for new trial based on newly discovered evidence only if
the evidence (1) is '"such as could not with reasonable diligence have been
discovered and produced at the trial'"; (2) is '"not... merely cumulative"'; and (3) is
'"such as to render a different result probable on the retrial of the case.'" State v.
Montoya, 2004 UT 5, ^ 11,84 P.3d 1183 (citation omitted). Finally, under the rule, a
motion for new trial may not be filed prior to entry of a final judgment of
conviction, but, rather, must be filed "not later than 10 days after entry of the
sentence, or within such further time as the court may fix before the expiration of
the time for filing a motion for new trial." Utah R. Crim. P. 24(c) (emphasis added).
The State's timely pretrial motion to reopen a suppression hearing was not a
motion for new trial. It was not filed after a final judgment of conviction had been
entered. See Utah R. Crim. P. 24(c). And it was not filed to upset any final judgment
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of conviction. See Utah R. Crim. P. 24(c). Rather, the State's timely motion to reopen
a suppression hearing was a pretrial motion to reopen the evidence on Defendant's
suppression motion. By its own terms, therefore, rule 24 did not apply to the State's
motion.
Obvious error. The trial court's error in applying rule 24 to the State's timely
pretrial motion to reopen the suppression hearing should have been obvious
because the principles governing motions to reopen evidentiary hearings made
before final judgment are well-established under Utah case law.
Under that case law, a trial court has broad discretion to reopen evidentiary
hearings, regardless of whether the evidence sought to be presented is newly
discovered. See Gardner v. Christensen, 622 P.2d 782,784 (Utah 1980); Ross v. Leftwich,
14 Utah 2d 71,377 P.2d 495,497 (1963); State v. Lawrence, 120 Utah 323,234 P.2d 600,
601 (1951); State v. Duncan, 102 Utah 449, 132 P.2d 121, 125 (1942); Wasatch Oil
Refining Co. v. Wade, 92 Utah 50,63 P.2d 1070,1075 (1936); State v. Seel, 827 P.2d 954,
962 (Utah App. 1992).
Moreover, under that case law, a trial court's discretion should "be liberally
exercised in behalf of allowing the whole case to be presented." Wasatch Oil Refining
Co., 63 P.2d at 1075. It should not "be exercised in a capricious and arbitrary
manner which produces an inequitable or unjust result." Gardner, 622 P.2d at 784;
see also Ross, 377 P.2d at 497 (holding trial court abused its discretion in denying
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motion to reopen civil case where "motion was timely made" and "defendants
would not be placed at a disadvantage"); Lawrence, 234 P.2d at 601 (suggesting that,
where defendant moved for dismissal for insufficient evidence at close of evidence,
"State's attorney might properly and with little difficulty have moved to reopen and
supply the missing evidence"); Duncan, 132 P.2d at 125 (holding trial court has
discretion to reopen case to "prevent a miscarriage of justice"); Seel, 827 P.2d at 962
(rejecting claim that trial court committed plain error in allowing State to reopen
evidence during jury trial even though missing evidence was apparently available at
time evidence initially closed); cf. State v. Willard, 801 P.2d 189,191 (Utah App. 1990)
(citing approvingly of case law from other jurisdictions holding that trial courts
have discretion to reconsider pre-trial rulings on motions to suppress).
Prejudice. Finally, the State was prejudiced by the trial court's obvious error
in applying rule 24 to its motion to reopen the suppression hearing. The trial court's
refusal to reopen the suppression hearing because the State's evidence was not
newly discovered left the State without the ability to use Defendant's confession at
trial. Absent that confession, the State lacked sufficient evidence to pursue its
charges against Defendant. R. 99-98 (State moving to dismiss because trial court's
"suppression ruling has substantially impaired the State's case against the
Defendant").
* ****
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In sum, the trial court committed obvious and prejudicial error when it ruled
that the newly discovered evidence standard applicable to post-judgment motions
for new trial under rule 24 also applies to timely pretrial motions to reopen
suppression hearings. Thus, this Court should reverse the trial court's ruling.
B. Under the proper abuse of discretion standard, the trial court
should have granted the State's timely pretrial motion to reopen
the suppression hearing, where the State omitted, but did not
purposefully withhold, crucial evidence from the initial hearing.
Under the proper abuse of discretion standard, the trial court should have
granted the State's timely pretrial motion to reopen the suppression hearing.
As stated, this Court has recognized that a trial court has broad discretion in
deciding whether to reopen evidentiary matters before a final judgment is entered.
See, e.g., Ross, 377 P.2d at 497; Lawrence, 234 P.2d at 601; Duncan, 132 P.2d at 125;
Wasatch Oil, 63 P.2d at 1075.
As this Court has also recognized, however, a trial court's discretion should
"be liberally exercised in behalf of allowing the whole case to be presented."
Wasatch Oil Refining Co., 63 P.2d at 1075. It should "not be exercised in a capricious
and arbitrary manner which produces an inequitable or unjust result," Gardner, 622
P.2d at 784.
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These principles are particularly important when the motion at issue seeks to
reopen a suppression hearing. First, admissions of guilt resulting from valid
Miranda waivers "'are more than merely "desirable"; they are essential to society's
compelling interest in finding, convicting, and punishing those who violate the
law/" Texas v. Cobb, 532 U.S. 162,172 (2001) (citations omitted).
Second, a wrongly decided suppression motion could "cost the State its
opportunity to pursue a serious criminal charge." State v. James, 635 P.2d 1102,1104
(Wash. Ct. App. 1981) (reversing denial of State's motion to continue suppression
hearing where "denial of a continuance cost the State its opportunity to pursue a
serious criminal charge"). Yet, there exists a "strong public interest in adjudicating
[criminal] cases on the merits." United States v. Roberts, 978 F.2d 17,22 (1st Cir. 1992)
(reviewing ruling on motion to reopen under "interest of justice" standard).
Finally, "[t]he justice system is not a sporting event in which each side has a
right to exploit every tactical advantage available." Medel v. State, 2008 UT 32, ^ 54,
184 P.3d 1226. Nor is it "a sporting event in which the rules of the game trump the
search for truth." State v. Perkins, 856 A.2d 917, 937 (Conn. 2004). Rather, "[a]
primary purpose of [the justice system] is the vindication of the laws of a civilized
society against those who are guilty of transgressing those laws." State v. Howell,
649 P.2d 91,94 (Utah 1982).
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Each of these interests should inform the trial court's discretion when ruling
on pretrial motions to reopen suppression hearings. And, in light of these interests,
"vague notions of unfairness, that the government should not have 'two bites' off
the same apple, ought not control" whether to grant a motion to reopen a
suppression hearing. United States v. Bayless, 201 F.3d 116, 132 (2nd Cir. 2000)
(citation omitted). Rather, "it is 'better practice for the court to reconsider a pretrial
[suppression] ruling 'where serious grounds arise as to the correctness of the
[original] ruling.'" State v. Simoneau, 833 A.2d 1280, 1291 (Vt. 2003) (citations
omitted).
Consequently," [i]f the government possesses evidence showing that, in fact,
no official misconduct occurred [in obtaining a defendant's statement], the interests
of justice militate strongly in favor of considering this evidence even if it is belatedly
brought to the district court's attention." In re Terrorist Bombings of U.S. Embassies in
East Africa, 552 F.3d 177,197 (2nd Cir. 2008); see also Regilio, 669 F.2d at 1177 ("If
matters appearing later indicate that no constitutional violation occurred, society's
interest in admitting all relevant evidence militates strongly in favor of permitting
reconsideration."); cf. State v. Ellis, 491 So.2d 1296,1296-97 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986);
State v. Moore, lib S.W.2d 372,375 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1989).
As a result, a majority of jurisdictions considering the issue have rejected the
notion that motions to reopen suppression hearings must be based on newly
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discovered evidence. See, e.g., Ark. R. Crim. P. 16.2(c); State v. Harvey, 573 So.2d 111,
113 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991); Martin v. State, 411 S.E.2d 910,912 (Ga. Ct. App. 1991);
People v. Wagner, 427 N.E.2d 985, 986 (111. Ct. App. 1981); State v. Doughty, 472
N.W.2d 299,302 n.2 (Minn. 1991); State v. Pilot, 2004 WL1551517 (Nos. CA2003-03023, CA2003-03-24) (Ohio App. July 12,2004); Commonwealth v. Branch, 437 A.2d 748,
750-51 (Pa. 1981); State v. Moore, 775 S.W.3d 372, 375 (Term. Crim. App. 1989);
Montalvo v. State, 846 S.W.2d 133,137-38 (Tex. App. 1993); Thompson v. Steptoe, 366
S.E.2d 647, 650 (W.Va. 1988); United States v. Brown, 449 F.3d 741 (6th Cir. 2006);
United States v. Kithcart, 218 F.3d 213,220 (3rd Cir. 2000); United States v. Dickerson,
166 F.3d 667, 679 & n i l (4* Cir. 1999), rev'd on other grounds, 530 U.S. 428 (2000);
United States v. Villabona-Garnica, 63 F.3d 1051,1055 (11th Cir. 1995); United States v.
Greely, 425 F.2d 592,593 (5th Cir. 1970); McRae v. United States, 420 F.2d 1283,128689 (D.C. Cir. 1969); but see State v. Landry, 339 So.2d 8 (La. 1976); Md. Rule 4252(h)(2).
Rather, courts have identified a broad spectrum of factors that should inform
a trial court's discretion when ruling on a motion to reopen a suppression hearing.
These factors, which acknowledge both society's interest in prosecuting serious
crimes and a trial court's need to control the proceedings before it, include:
the nature of the case, Roberts, 978 F.2d at 22;
the experience of the prosecutor, James, 635 P.2d at 1104;
30

the timeliness of the motion, Roberts, 978 F.2d at 22;
the reason for not presenting the evidence at the first hearing,
including whether the defendant's motion adequately raised the
issue, James, 635 P.2d at 1104; and whether "the State deliberately
withheld the evidence" at the first hearing, Stewart, 827 A.2d at
874, or the evidence was "inadvertently omitted by the
prosecution," Branch, 437 A.2d at 751; Thompson, 366 S.E.2d at
650; Roberts, 978 F.2d at 23; Dickerson, 166 F.3d at 679; Rabb, 752
F.2datl323.
whether the evidence "would have impacted upon the decision
of the trial court and was crucial to the state's argument," Ellis,
491 So.2d at 1296; Roberts, 978 F.2d at 24; Rabb, 752 F.2d at 1323;
Regilio, 669 F.2d at 1177;
whether reopening the hearing will "impair[] the ability of the
defendant to answer and otherwise receive a fair trial," Stewart,
827 A.2d at 873; Roberts, 978 F.2d at 23; Rabb, 752 F.2d at 1323;
and,
the impact of reopening on a trial court's resources or docket,
Roberts, 978 F.2d at 23; Dickerson, 166 F.3d at 679.
None of these factors mandate that a trial court grant a motion to reopen in
every case. However, they do support a liberal exercise of discretion in favor of
reopening hearings in the pretrial suppression motion context.
And these factors weigh heavily in favor of briefly reopening the suppression
hearing in this case. First, this case involves a first degree felony drug charge as
well as numerous other serious charges, and the trial court's initial ruling on
Defendant's suppression motion affected the State's ability to pursue those charges.
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Second, Defendant's original motion focused on the sufficiency of the second
Miranda warning. R. 39-37; 65-55. Consequently, the prosecutor focused on that
issue during the first suppression hearing. R. H3:passim. There is no evidence that
the prosecutor deliberately withheld evidence concerning the first Miranda warning.
Third, in its oral ruling on Defendant's motion, the trial court noted the
absence of evidence concerning Defendant's first Miranda warning and indicated
that such evidence may have altered its decision. In light of the trial court's ruling,
evidence concerning Defendant's first Miranda warnings became crucial to the
prosecutor's argument
Fourth, although the prosecutor did not orally move to reopen the
suppression hearing as soon as the trial court noted that evidence concerning the
first Miranda warning was relevant, the prosecutor filed a written motion to reopen
within two days of the trial court's oral ruling.
Fifth, nothing in the record suggests that reopening the hearing at that point
would have impaired Defendant's ability to respond to the evidence or to otherwise
receive a fair trial.
Finally, nothing in the record suggests that reopening the hearing at that point
would have unduly interfered with the trial court's resources or docket.
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Given the multitude of factors weighing in favor of granting the State's
motion to briefly reopen the suppression hearing, the trial court abused its
discretion in denying the State's motion.
CONCLUSION
The totality of the circumstances does not support the trial court's conclusion
that Defendant was not sufficiently advised of his Miranda rights to render his
waiver knowing and intelligent. Thus, trial court erred in granting Defendant's
motion to suppress his confession.
Alternatively, the trial court committed plain error when it applied the newly
discovered evidence standard governing motions for new trial to the State's timely
pretrial motion to reopen the suppression hearing. Under the proper standard, the
court should have granted the State's motion. Thus, this Court should remand this
matter to the trial court with an order to reopen the suppression hearing.

Respectfully submitted July 1, 2009.
MARKL. SHURTLEFF

Utah Attorney General

/Leu Q. rlooxf^^e
KXREN A. KLUCZNIK

J

Assistant Attorney General
Counsel for Appellee

33

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that on July 1,2009, two copies of the foregoing brief were 0 mailed
• hand-delivered to:
Margaret P. Lindsay
775 West Center Street
P.O. Box 1058
Spanish Fork, Utah 84660

A digital copy of the brief was also included: 0Yes • No

V

Addenda

Addendum A

United States Constitution, Amendment V
Amendment V. Grand jury indictment for capital crimes; double jeopardy;
self-incrimination; due process of law; just compensation for property
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime,
unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising
in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of
War or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to
be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal
case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use,
without just compensation.

Utah R. Crim. P. 24
RULE 2 4 . MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL
(a) The court may, upon motion of a party or upon its own initiative, grant a
new trial in the interest of justice if there is any error or impropriety which had
a substantial adverse effect upon the rights of a party.
(b) A motion for a new trial shall be made in writing and upon notice. The
motion shall be accompanied by affidavits or evidence of the essential facts in
support of the motion. If additional time is required to procure affidavits or
evidence the court may postpone the hearing on the motion for such time as it
deems reasonable.
(c) A motion for a new trial shall be made not later than 10 days after entry
of the sentence, or within such further time as the court may fix before
expiration of the time for filing a motion for new trial.
(d) If a new trial is granted, the party shall be in the same position as if no
trial had been held and the former verdict shall not be used or mentioned either
in evidence or in argument.

Addendum B

Addendum C

ALPINE/HIGHLAND POLICE DEPARTMENT
Admonition of Rights

DATE

TIME

\i\:Ho «=*

PLACE
Before we ask you any questions, you must understand your rights- Those rights are:
You have the right to remain silent.
If you give up the right to remain silent, anything you say can and will be used against
you in a court of law.
You have the right to speak with an attorney and to have the attorney present during
questioning.
]4jj

If you so desire and cannot afford one, an attorney will be appointed for you without
charge before questioning.

If you decide to answer questions now without a lawyer/attorney present, you will still have the right to stop
answering questions at any time. You also have the right to stop answering at any time until you have talked
to a lawyer/attorney.

WAIVER OF RIGHTS
I have been "warned" regarding my rights and have read the above statement regarding my rights. I
understand what my rights are. I am willing to make a statement and answer questions. I do not want
a lawyer at this time. I understand and know what I am doing. No promises or threats have been
made to me and no pressure or coercion of any kind has been used against me.
Date

MAY I

Time

ZOO?

)*N/£

Witness
Officer Administrating Rigl

Signature
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P R O C E E D I N G S
THE COURT:

All right.

Which case should we tackle

first?
MR. JOHNSON :
MR. MEANS:

Mr. Bozung's.

Who is going to be out here in just a

1

minute •?
MR. JOHNSON :

Transport took everyone down except

1

Mr. Bozung.
THE COURT:
MR. JOHNSON

And he's locked away.

1

Yeah, apparently in the holding cell

here.
THE COURT:

No one gives us a key to that door.

All right.

We'll go to our file number, and we're on

with a court reporter , 071402713.

1

This is the State of Utah

versus Gareth Bozung \tfho is here and in custody and represented J
by Mr. Means, and Mr. Johnson is here for the State.

1

And evidently the parties have a different way of
doing 1Lhis than an evidentiary hearing; isn't that right?
MR. MEANS:

Well, you decide, your Honor, I'll

THE COURT:

Have you got a transcript there for the

I
1

just -

preliminary hearing?
MR. MEANS:

I do.

THE COURT:

Oh, we don't yet.

J

MR. MEANS:

Let me make sure that's what it is.

1
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Yep, October 10.

All right.

In brief, my argument

for suppression is the adequacy of Miranda warning given on
May 1st when Mr. Bozung was arrested on another one of the
cases he is charged with which we're about to go to trial on.
He was interviewed that day relative to this case also.

A tape

was made of the recording, I'm sorry, a recording was made of
the interview including the recitation of Miranda rights.

And

speaking for Mr. Johnson, I believe he's going to submit to the
Court an exhibit that Mr. Bozung signed a written waiver of
rights form which we commonly see.

I stipulate to the

submission of that today.
It would be my intention today simply to submit the
tape that I was provided by the State which represents that
interview as evidence.
in that evidence.
today.

I would argue about what you would see

I don't know that you want to hear that

I would think that maybe Mr. Johnson ought to review

the tape and it would be probably my position to make the
arguments about what I do and don't hear in the tape and then
for him to respond in writing if that's -THE COURT:

Let me ask.

Is the written Miranda

filled out immediately after the oral Miranda is given?
MR. MEANS:

It would be my statement that it was

filled out simultaneously.
MR. JOHNSON:

And if we want to briefly call

Detective Moosman just to establish that foundation.
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MR. MEANS:

That's fine.

THE COURT:

I think that's a factual issue.

MR. MEANS:

That's fine.

MR. JOHNSON:

State would call Detective Moosman to

the stand
THE COURT:

All right.

Please come up and be sworn

in.
DETECTIVE MOOSMAN
Called by the State, being first

J

Duly sworn, testified as follows:
THE CLERK:

You do solemnly swear that the testimony

you are about to give in the case now before the Court will be
the truth , the whole truth and nothing but the truth, so help

1

you God?
THE WITNESS:
THE COURT:
THE WITNESS:
THE COURT:

I do.
Let's get a spelling on his name.
Moosman, M-o-o-s-m-a-n.

1

I had it right.

DIRECT EXAMINATION
BY MR. JOHNSON:
Q

Detective, with whom do you work?

A

Alpine Highland Police Department.

Q

What's your position?

A

Investigations.
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I

Q

Okay.

So you're a detective?

A

Yes.

Q

And in that capacity were you working on May 1st,

A

Yes, I was.

Q

Did you interview a Gareth Bozung?

A

Yes, I did.

Q

What were the circumstances that you were

2007?

interviewing him briefly?
A

I was interviewing him regarding a case of an

overdose and drugs that we were investigating.
Q

Okay.

Where did this interview take place?

A

It took place at Lehi Police Department.

Q

And how did Mr. Bozung come to be at the police

department?
A
charges.

Lehi Police Department picked him up on other
I was notified he was there and asked them to hold

him and not transport him to jail until I could respond and
talk to him.
Q

So he was in custody at that time?

A

Yes, he was.

Q

With handcuffs on?

A

Yes.

Q

Awaiting other charges?

A

Yes.
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Q

Specifically where in the jail or where in the police

department did this take place?
A

Second floor in the interview room.

Q

And who else was with you if anyone?

A

Nobody.

Q

Okay.

A

We had both video and I also had a pocket digital

And what sort of recording did you employ?

voice recorder.
Q

And did you turn those on before talking with

Mr. Bozung?
A

Yes, we did.
THE COURT:

Both?

THE WITNESS:
THE COURT:
MR. JOHNSON:

Both.

Thank you.
Q.

And did you submit a copy of the

videotape of that interview to my office to give to Mr. Means?
A

Only the audible -- audiotapes I believe.

The

videotape was booked into evidence.
Q

Okay.

And how did this interview start?

What did

you say to Mr. Bozung?
A

When he first came in, he was just telling me about

the reason he was there and what Lehi had picked him up for
while they got him a drink.

Once the drink was provided to

him, he talked about some other irrelevant things and then at
that point he -- we started by going over the admonition, the
CERTIFIED COURT TRANSCRIPT

rights form.
Q

These initial statements by the defendant, were they

made at the request of -- in response to your questions or just
kind of spontaneous?
A

No, he was just telling me different things on his

Q

Okay.

own.
And then you said that you gave him -- you

read him his rights or explained to him his rights.

Could you

explain that process?
A

I pulled out an admonition of rights form and sat

down and informed him, because he was in custody, that I needed
to go over his rights.

I started out by reading the first

line.
MR. JOHNSON:
THE COURT:

If I can approach, your Honor?

Yes.

MR. JOHNSON:

Q.

Showing you what's been previously

marked as State's Exhibit 1.
Do you recognize that?
A

That is a form that was filled out at that time.
MR. JOHNSON:

The State would move to admit No. 1

into evidence.
MR. MEANS:

No objection.

THE COURT:

Okay.

It's received.

(State's Exhibit No. 1 was received into evidence.)
MR. JOHNSON:

If I might give that to the Court to
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review as Detective Moosman testifies.
THE COURT:

Okay.

MR. JOHNSON:

Q.

Okay.

With -- where were you

sitting or standing in relation to the defendant while this
form was given to him?
A

To his left.

Q

You were sitting next to him?

A

Yes.

Q

Okay.

And how -- did you go over the form in detail

with him?
A

I turned around so he could read it.

started reading it to him.
right to remain silent.
he stated that he did.

At that time I

I read the first line that he had a

I asked him if he understood that and
At that time Mr. Bozung told me that

the Lehi Police Department had just read him those rights and
he asked me if he could just read it and sign the form and
because of his emotional state I agreed to.
Q

Okay.

When he said he'd already been read his

rights, what did you understand that to be?
A

That he had already been given his Miranda rights by

the Lehi Police Department.
Q

The same ones that are on the admonition form that's

Exhibit 1?
A

That's correct.

Q

So approximately -- well, what did Mr. Bozung do next
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after you told him to read over it?
A

At that point I told him I needed him to initial by

each thing stating he had read it and that he understood those
rights.
Q

Did you witness him doing just that?

A

Yes, I did.

Q

And is this with a pen or pencil that you provided?

A

Pen.

Q

And so he went down each one of the rights and

initialed?
A

Yes, during the time he was asking me some questions

and making statements, but he did.
Q

Do you recall what those were?

A

I do not.

Q

Okay.

Were they anything of the nature of I want a

lawyer?
A

No, they were not.

Q

I don't want to talk to you?

A

No, they were not. And they were not questions

regarding Miranda.

They were just questions in general from my

memory.
Q

Okay.

At the end of the form after he initialed all

the other parts, what's at the bottom part of the form as far
as a waiver?
A

It states that he has been warned regarding his
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rights, that he's read the above statements regarding his
rights, that he understands what they are, that he was willing
to make a statement and answer questions, that he did not want
a lawyer at that time, and that he understood and knew what he
was doing and no promises or threats had been made to him and
no pressure or coertion of any kind had been used against him.
Q

Okay.

And then below that admonition or waiver is

there a line for him to sign?
A

There is.

Q

And did he sign that in your presence?

A

Yes, he did.

Q

Is there anything else on that form that you think is

relevant to our discussion of Miranda today?
A

Nope, not that I can think of.

Q

Okay.

And to be clear, during that whole process

before you started asking him about questions of this incident,
he did not invoke his right to remain silent or to consult an
attorney?
A

No, he did not.

Q

And after he signed that, what did you do next?

A

After he signed that, I signed the form on the bottom

as author initiating the rights, filed that with the rest of my
paperwork and started interviewing him regarding the death of
Joshua Razeeka (phonetic) and his role during the night that
Joshua Razeeka died.
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Q

Okay.

Did he make any incriminating statements as a

result of the questioning?
A

Yes, he did.

Q

What were those in general?

A

He notified me that he had sold Joshua Razeeka

heroin, that he had been in possession of heroin, that it was
in his pocket at the time we arrived at the house to start our
investigation, and also that he had secured a bong from Joshua
Razeeka's room and had hidden it so we would not find it.
Q

Okay.

As a result of that conversation and your

other investigation, you forwarded that case to be filed as the
one we're here on today?
A

That's correct.
MR. JOHNSON:

That's all I have for this witness.

CROS S-EXAMINATION
BY MR. MEANS:
Q

Officer Moosman, you both audibly and visually

recorded the entire interview?
A

Yes.

Q

To include the discussion you just advised us of

regarding his rights?
A

That's correct.

Q

And the signing of the form?

A

That's correct.
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Q

Have you reviewed -- let me back up.
You have provided the State with the audio portion?

A

Yes, I have.

Q

But not the video yet?

A

I don't believe we have.

Q

Do you still have the video?

A

It f s right here.

Q

Good.

A

I have not.

Q

Since the date it was taken?

A

No, I haven't.

Q

Have you reviewed the audio?

A

Just briefly.

Q

Did you -- did you make the recording yourself?

A

Yes, I did.

Q

Speaking of the audio recording?

A

Yes.

Q

And the video recording also?

A

That was done by the Lehi Police Department.

Q

Insofar as you reviewed the audio recording and based

All right.

You have reviewed the video?

Parts of it.

upon you being there and based upon you doing your recording,
any reason in your mind why the audio recording of the entire
event would not be accurate?
A

No.

Q

It would provide an accurate record of what occurred
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that day?
A

Yes, it would.

Q

Regarding your testimony today that Mr. Bozung told

you he had previously been given his Miranda rights by Lehi
city officers, is that what he said?
A

He told me, as I started going over Miranda, that

Lehi officers had already gone over that with him.
Q

Is that your only knowledge of if or to what extent

he was read his Miranda rights by Lehi was Gareth's own
statement?
A

Yes.

Q

You weren't present when -- just ask the obvious

questions -- you weren't present when Lehi officers advised him
of his Miranda rights if they did?
A

No, I was not.

Q

You're not personally aware of that --

A

No, I'm not.

Q

- - i f that happened?
MR. MEANS:

That's all I have, your Honor, for

purposes of this hearing.
MR. JOHNSON:

State has no redirect.

THE COURT:

All right.

You may be seated.

MR. MEANS:

Could I make one suggestion, though?

THE COURT:

Well, it's about the same suggestion I'm

going to make I suspect.
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to put on?

MR. MEANS:

Okay.

THE COURT:

Any other witnesses or evidence we need

My suggestion is that, first of all, the State

needs to get a copy of the video and provide it to Mr. Means so
both parties have both the video and the audio recording and
that the briefs be submitted to the Court along with a copy of
the video and audio so that you do your briefing with both of
you having seen and heard everything there is to see and hear.
And then the State could respond to yours, Mr. Means, and along
with that provide a copy of both the tapes and -MR. MEANS:

Judge, I've already filed a motion to

suppress which is a bare bones motion.
THE COURT:

Yeah.

MR. MEANS:

Do you want me to take the lead in

THE COURT:

I think so.

briefing?
I think it's your briefing

and your bare bones was exactly what we wanted for purposes of
where we are now.

I would suggest that I give this back and

then make that a part -MR. JOHNSON:
THE COURT:

Certainly, your Honor.
- - o f either motion or either brief so I

get it, but that's the logical way to approach it.
MR. JOHNSON:
THE COURT:

Yep.
Is that what you were going to suggest,

Mr. Means?
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MR. MEANS:

I don't know.

THE COURT:

The way that I set out the briefing.

MR. MEANS:

Yes.

THE COURT:

Is that what you were going to suggest?

MR. MEANS:

Yes.

THE COURT:

All right.

I don't know what you were

saying.

How soon -- well, how soon

could we get this videotape copied?
MR. JOHNSON :

He said he can make it today and bring

it down first of next week or mail it today.
THE COURT:

Okay.

Well, why don't we have him make

the copies for both.
MR. JOHNSON:

Yeah, and I will give him Mr. Means'

address and I'll mail one to him and he'll mail one to me.
THE COURT:
MR. JOHNSON:
THE COURT:

Okay.
We'll do that.
All right.

If you'll double check them

after copies are made to make sure they really work.
we have that problem.

Sometimes

So if he gets that to you early next

week, gets it mailed off today.
OFFICER MOOSMAN:

I'll drop that in the mail today,

your Honor.
MR. MEANS:

Is there a chance you could copy to

digital?
OFFICER MOOSMAN:

We do not have that ability at our
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police department I'm afraid.
THE COURT:

Okay.

MR. MEANS:

It's just easier.

MR. JOHNSON:

It's not as high technology as the

public defender's office.
MR. MEANS:

We have video too.

MR. JOHNSON:
THE COURT:
around.

Oh, okay.
There's a few old-fashioned machines

And if he gets that to you in the mail today, which

means you'll probably have it by the time you come back from
the holiday on Monday, how long would it take you to get your
motion in?
MR. MEANS:

Let me state it this way.

We all have

two trials with Mr. Bozung on the 11th and 12th back to back.
THE COURT:

Okay.

MR. MEANS:

I would prefer that I have a chance to

focus on those first before I do this motion.

I don't know

that it changes his status or the State's position, so if I
could have until after the first of the year to actually do
this.
THE COURT:

Let me ask this.

Is this something we

want to address as far as a briefing schedule at the end of the
second trial?
MR. JOHNSON:
MR. MEANS:

That would be more appropriate.
I think so.
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THE COURT:

I think depending on what happens in

those two trials it's probably going to affect what happens in
this case in all reality so I'm that realistic, but if we could
still have you get them the tapes immediately so they have
them.
And why don't you schedule this for a status
conference on the date of the second trial which is the 12th;
is that correct?
MR. JOHNSON:

It's a Tuesday.

If that's the 12th

then -THE COURT:

Can't be the 12th.

MR. JOHNSON:
THE COURT:

It's 10th and 11th.
So let's set this for a scheduling

conference with regard to the motion to suppress to be handled
at the end of the second trial on the 11th, okay?
MR. JOHNSON:
THE COURT:

Okay.
Sometime after five I'm guessing.

We'll

just put it for 4:00 for the fun of it and if we're done before
then, great.

And is our pretrial next week on the two other

cases?
MR. JOHNSON:
THE COURT:

I believe it is, yeah.
Okay.

As far as we know, we're going

forward on the two other cases?
MR. MEANS:
MR. JOHNSON:

I think so.
For the State, yeah.
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THE COURT: All right.

Okay.

So we won't worry

about setting the schedule until we know where we are on the
other two cases. All right.
Let me ask.

Sounds good to me.

Thank you.

Do both parties have a copy of the audio

tape now?
MR. MEANS: Yes.
MR. JOHNSON: Yes.
(PROCEEDINGS IN THE ABOVE-ENTITLED
MATTER WERE CONCLUDED.)
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THE JUDGE:
o'clock.

Okay.

All right.

It is 9:00

I'm ready for anything.

5

MR. JOHNSON:

6

THE JUDGE:

Are we ready for Mr. Bozung?

7

MR. MEANS:

We can be, Your Honor. Yes.

8

THE JUDGE:

Okay.

9
10

Do you want to start with the

sentencing or do you want to start with the motion to
suppress?
MR. MEANS:

11
12

One through four, Your Honor.

Let's do the sentencing first,

Your Honor, if that's all right with you.
THE JUDGE:

13

Okay.

All right

SENTENCING

14
MR. MEANS:

15

Judge, I was not given a copy of the

16

PSI, I have not received it yet.

17

memory of a review of it with Mr. Bozung this morning.
THE JUDGE:

18

Well, can I just say as a prefix I'm a

19

little concerned about the matrix.

20

felony convictions—

21

MR. MEANS:

Right.

22

THE JUDGE:

—

23
24
25

So I'm speaking from my

They show two prior

and the criminal history I had in

front of me just showed one.
MR. MEANS:

And I was going to point that out to

the court.

PAGE 3

THE JUDGE:

1
2

Makes a two point difference and puts

him down a little.
MR. MEANS:

3

It does.

Additionally, Your Honor,

4

while in certain parts of the PSI it makes reference to the

5

case that's number three on your calendar today as being a

6

present offense, it's not addressed in the recommendation

7

and it's not, the face of the recommendation as I read it

8

anyway.

9

THE JUDGE:

I do have a separate—

10

MR. MEANS:

Do you have two PSIs?

11

THE JUDGE:

I've, I've got two PSIs.

12

MR. MEANS:

Okay.

13

THE JUDGE:

I have one that covers the two

15

MR. MEANS:

All right.

16

THE JUDGE:

—

17

MR. MEANS:

Well, there you go.

18

THE JUDGE:

And then I have a separate one for

MR. MEANS:

All right.

14

19

cases—

ending in 2801 and 3285.

1958.

20

We did not, I haven't

21

seen the 1958 recommendation but I'm assuming that the, it's

22

the s a m e —

23

THE JUDGE:

Same recommendation—

24

MR. MEANS:

—

for commitment.

25

THE JUDGE:

—

and the same matrix with the same

L

rin

A

1
2

score.
MR. MEANS:

Well, that's the first observation

3

I'd make is that I believe he should be scored with a total

4

score of 10 which would place him on the next lower r o w —

5

THE JUDGE:

Yes.

6

MR. MEANS:

—

in the matrix.

For the two cases

7

that are together, and I've forgotten their numbers, my

8

memory was that would still land him in a black or a dark

9

gray square.

10
11

THE JUDGE:

Yes.

It would take him from 78

months to 72.

12

MR. MEANS:

And in the other c a s e —

13

THE JUDGE:

Takes him one row down and

14

intermediate.

15

MR. MEANS:

Okay.

16

THE JUDGE:

I believe.

Let me just make sure my

17

memory is right.

He's in 18 months in intermediate, it

18

would take him to 16 months in intermediate.

19

MR. MEANS:

He's in intermediate either way?

20

THE JUDGE:

Uh-huh (affirmative).

21

MR. MEANS:

Because it's a second degree?

22

THE JUDGE:

Uh-huh (affirmative).

23

MR. MEANS:

Is it listed a t —

24

THE JUDGE:

Second degree possession.

25

MR. MEANS:

Possession.

All right.

•D7\r,TT

C

1

THE JUDGE:

Uh-huh (affirmative).

Yes.

2

MR. MEANS:

As a part of my arguments on

3

sentencing, Your Honor, I want to also argue my motion that

4

the court consider under Rule 402, 76-3-402 that the court...

5

Did you get my motion to enter judgment in the next

6

lower category of offense?

7

THE JUDGE:

Which one?

8

MR. MEANS:

It would be in a —

9

MR. JOHNSON:
MR. MEANS:

10

Which case?

2801.
2801.

The case, the only case that a,

1 1 has a first degree felony.
12

MR. JOHNSON:

13

THE JUDGE:

14

MR. JOHNSON:

15

THE JUDGE:

16

MR. MEANS:

For the trial.
I think I did.

I just couldn't figure
Yes, it's here.

The other matters are frankly just not

subject to that motion.

19

THE JUDGE:

20

MR. JOHNSON:

21

Oh.

out why I only got it in one case.

17
18

The trial, yes.

Okay.

Well—

And the state did file a response.

I don't know if the court has received that.
THE JUDGE:

No, we haven't.

24

MR. MEANS:

I think I got it yesterday.

25

MR. JOHNSON:

22
23

When did it come

m?

I've got a copy for the court.

THE JUDGE:

1

I'm short a clerk.

2

downstairs.

3

with an hour on lunch break.

4

keep?

It's probably

And we were in court from 9:00 to 5:00 yesterday
That's an extra copy we could

5

MR. JOHNSON:

6

THE JUDGE:

Well, let me ask you this,

8

MR. MEANS:

Uh-huh (affirmative).

9

THE JUDGE:

Let's say I do follow their

7

10

Yes.

Mr. Means.

recommendation and I send him up to prison.

11

MR. MEANS:

Uh-huh (affirmative).

12

THE JUDGE:

Do you want to fix that matrix with

MR. MEANS:

At the very least I want to fix that

13

AP&P?

14
15

matrix, yes.
THE JUDGE:

16

Because it's going to follow him to

17

the board of pardons.

18

know if it's going to change their recommendation but a, at

19

the very least if I, and I haven't made the decision, but

20

if I were to send him to prison I think it's very important

21

that he go up with the right matrix in front of the board.
MR. MEANS:

22
23

And what you're suggesting is is that

the department make that change so that it's official?
THE JUDGE:

24
25

And I think in all fairness, I don't

them.

You talk to them, Mr. Johnson talks to

And I mean, Mr. Johnson, do you see the matrix the
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1

same way we do?
MR. JOHNSON:

2

I do.

With respect to that,

3

Your Honor, I was looking further on the supervision history,

4

I, I thought that one of these is a (inaudible word) while he

5

was on pretrial release for the other.

6

looking at.

7

understand.

8

And my understanding is that we have to reduce that to

9

writing because the board is not going to get anything we do

10
11
12

That would only bring him up one more point I
So it would still be in that third category.

in court.
THE JUDGE:

MR. JOHNSON:

14

THE JUDGE:

MR. MEANS:

17

MR. JOHNSON:

18

THE JUDGE:

19

MR. JOHNSON:

21
22
23
24
25

So either the option is that

Yes.
And I think the safest thing for him

is to have it in AP&P records so it's right.

16

20

Right.

we do it by an order or we get AP&P to do it.

13

15

That's what I was

Probably is.
That's what they pull up, yes.
Yes.
I'm fine with passing this to any

other matters that are trailing, whatever the court wants.
THE JUDGE:

Do you think you can do it in a week,

Mr. Means, or shall we give it two?
MR. MEANS:

It doesn't matter to me personally,

Your Honor.
THE JUDGE:

Mr. Bozung, are you willing to wait a

1

couple of weeks so we can fix this?

2

THE DEFENDANT:

3

THE JUDGE:

That's fine, Your Honor.

Okay.

I think it's the fair thing

4

for you.

You know, whether you go up or not you want your

5

history with AP&P to be accurate, and right now I don't think

6

it is.
So I'm going to continue the three sentencings.

7
8

I'll ask my clerk when you get the file to enter the state's

9

memorandum in opposition in one file.

I'll put it on top

10

with the transcript that's floating loose in there.

11

then let's continue the three sentencings that are number

12

two, three and four on the calendar today a, for disposition

13

for sentencing on February 6th which is two weeks from today

14

so that both attorneys, if you think you've got a problem

15

that needs to be fixed—

16

MR. JOHNSON:

17

THE JUDGE:

And

I'll speak with Mr. Means.
—

you'll each have the chance to

18

talk to AP&P and see if we can get an accurate matrix that

19

can be relied upon by me and/or the board of pardons.

20

Okay?
MR. MEANS:

21

THE JUDGE:

23

25

Thank you.

MOTION TO SUPPRESS

22

24

That's fine.

suppress.

Let's turn to the motion to

Are you ready to argue that today?
I have, this is our file number 071402713.

PAC;F Q

1

I've read a, the three memos from the attorneys, I've read

2

the State vs Snyder case, I've also looked at the a, DVD

3

myself.

4

So I'm interested...

5

the copy of the a, admonition of rights waiver that he signed

6

which we saw on the a, DVD.

7

arguments.

I've taken copious notes about what happens where.

MR. MEANS:

8
9
10

And I also still have in the court file

anything to add.

So I'm ready to hear your

Actually, Your Honor, I don't have

If you've viewed the tape it speaks for

itself.

11

THE JUDGE:

Okay.

12

MR. MEANS:

You have observed what I wanted the

13

court to observe.

14

in the tape.

I've made my comments on what I've seen

I'm sure the state has.

15

THE JUDGE:

Okay.

16

MR. MEANS:

And if you've seen it then I think you

1 7 can make a decision based upon a, in my opinion on the
18

pleadings and a, having viewed the tape.

19

THE JUDGE:

All right.

20

MR. MEANS:

It's the best evidence of what

21

occurred.
MR. JOHNSON:

22
23

I don't think we can add anything else to what we saw.
THE JUDGE:

24
25

And that's the state's position.

here?

You guys aren't going to help me

I was waiting for clarifying arguments from counsel.

Dantr 1 n

MR. JOHNSON:

1
2

A ruling for the state please,

Your Honor.
MR. MEANS:

3

Yes.

My clarifications are in, in

4

the writings.

I think that there's an obligation on the

5

part of the person who reads and rights to do so.

6

speaks of an officer who obviously because of his a, training

7

and experience probably has the rights memorized in his

8

head.

9

already know the rights to be sufficient.

Snyder

And they didn't find that just telling him you
They required

10

that there be a recitation or some reminding at that moment,

11

because at that moment when things are critical, not what a

12

person might know from the past.

13

one, two or three levels when you have a defendant who might

14

have had previous experience with his rights having been

15

read to him, but certainly not as much experience or

16

understanding as an officer would have to have that

17

defendant simply read the statement, first of all number one,

18

and find that to be a sufficient a, explanation of his

19

rights.

20

about unrelated items going on at the same time as the

21

defendant is allegedly or hopefully reading.

22

And I think it steps down

Or as in this case having an ongoing conversation

And my own observation of the tape is is that

23

Mr. Bozung is completely focused on problems with his

24

personal life, with his mom, with his family, talking about

25

what happened in the previous arrest, and Josh Rozeka
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1

(phonetic), and all kinds of things going through his head

2

as he's writing down apparently his initials.

3

certainly not looking, reading, comprehending and then

4

executing, and then reading the second admonition and

5

executing.

6

unrelated items.

7

don't think there's by a preponderance of the evidence a,

8

proof that he was either read his rights, recited his rights

9

or otherwise understood them from his reading, apparent

10

But

An ongoing colloquy with the officer about
I don't think that's a sufficient a, I

reading of them.
THE JUDGE:

11

Let me ask.

Based on the Strand

12

case and then the other, I'm sorry, the Snyder case and any

13

other case law you might have looked at, had he just been

14

handed the waiver form with no extraneous distractions and

15

read through it, would he be safe?

16

MR. MEANS:

I'm not, I don't think—

17

THE JUDGE:

Is that enough?

18

MR. MEANS:

I don't think so, Your Honor.

19

that's kind of an open question.

20

addressed directly—

21

THE JUDGE:

Uh-huh (affirmative).

22

MR. MEANS:

—

I think

I've never seen that

and I've never argued it

23

directly.

But it, but he has to be advised of his rights.

24

I suppose that there's an argument to be made that when

25

you're given the written word and you read it you've been

r>7\ rx?
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1

2

advised.
But the issue is do you know how to read, do you

3

know how to comprehend what you read, were you focused on

4

what you were reading, were you really reading it.

5

there's, I suppose it's really a proof problem—

6

THE JUDGE:

Uh-huh (affirmative).

7

MR. MEANS:

—

8

So

about whether or not if you hand a

person a piece of paper he's really—

9

THE JUDGE:

Uh-huh (affirmative).

10

MR. MEANS:

—

done what's necessary to advise

11

himself by reading those rights.

12

practice is that the officer needs to recite them.

13

THE JUDGE:

14

MR. JOHNSON:

And I think the better

Anything else, Mr. Johnson?
I just think that a, the Snyder

15

case is fairly distinguishable from this.

16

if this was like Snyder that when the defendant said oh,

17

I've already been, I've already been read these just a minute

18

ago, then the officer says okay, and takes away the paper and

19

then just starts with his interrogation, I think that would

20

be more similar to Snyder saying well, he said he understands

21

so I assume he does.

22

And I think, and

Here the officer didn't do that.

He said well,

23

you still need to read through each one.

24

be the preferred method is to have the officer so that we're

25

making sure he's not missing anything.

I think that would
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We have the proof of what he read right in front

1
2

of you, the court.

The tape, as the court no doubt noted

3

with the counter, it was approximately two minutes that a, he

4

was looking down during this, even during his one-sided

5

conversation he was looking down, appeared he was looking

6

from side to side, he had to initial each one.

7

At the end Officer Moosman, Detective Moosman

8

asked him a, if a, if he understood and agreed with the

9

waiver section.

10

Then a, he said yes.

And he signed it.

And then Detective Moosman said he'd signed it as a

1 1 witness.
12

Detective Moosman took every precaution under

13

these circumstances to make sure that the defendant

14

understood his rights even though Lehi police had just read

15

them to him minutes before on the Motel 6 case that he's

16

already to plead guilty on.

17

THE JUDGE:

18

MR. JOHNSON:

19

THE JUDGE:

How do I know that?
Based on h i s —
All he said, all that he said was,

20

all that the defendant said was a...

The officer said

21

because you, roughly, because you've been arrested so I need

22

to go through your rights with you.

And he reads to him you

23

do have the right to remain silent.

He asked him do you

24

understand that.

25

defendant says I can just read this, pointing to the door, he

And he hands him the pen.

And the
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1

just read me my rights.

2

So I don't...

That's all I got.
To me the problem is I don't know

3

how the other rights were read and whether or not they were

4

sufficient.

5

MR. JOHNSON:

Okay.

And that's why this is

6

different than Snyder because the officer didn't just stop at

7

that point and say okay, well we'll assume that you, that was

8

taken care of properly.

9
10

THE JUDGE:

Uh-huh (affirmative).

MR. JOHNSON:

Detective Moosman walked through

11

these copiously on the paper, had him look at that.

If

12

Mr. Bozung had just initialled, initialled and handed it in

13

without looking at it I would agree that we'd be in a

14

different situation.

15

through each one and initialled by each one, didn't just

16

initial once at the bottom, it seems clear by a

17

preponderance of the evidence that he did knowingly and

18

voluntarily waive his Miranda rights on that day.

But where he sat there and went

19

The state would submit it.

20

THE JUDGE:

Okay.

21

MR. MEANS:

I'd like to respond, Judge.

Anything else?
I think

22

you've hit upon a good point and I wanted to make that, that,

23

there's no record, you don't have any record of w h a t —

24

THE JUDGE:

Huh-uh (negative).

25

MR. MEANS:

—

what was done with regard to a

r> nrt?
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1

prior reading possibly of his rights. We don't know if it

2

was done in the same manner this was done, if it was done

3

with the right wording, if it was, what rights were read to

4

him.

5

been read his rights previous to the one that you saw in the

6

tape, number one.

7

There, there is no record in this case of him having

And then number two, I would just simply take

8

issue with the state that Officer Moosman cautiously and

9

completely and copiously went through his rights with him.

10

He simply read the first right very clearly, you have a

11

right to remain silent, here's a piece of paper after he

12

heard what a, Mr. Bozung said.

13

talking about all kinds of different things.

14

pausing and a waiting while he read.

15

their discussion about unrelated matters while presumably,

16

possibly I guess is a better word, possibly Mr. Bozung is

17

reading and talking and initialing all at the same time.

18

He certainly wasn't cautiously, he, Officer Moosman wasn't

19

cautiously taking care to make sure that Mr. Bozung

20

understood each of his rights.

21

THE JUDGE:

Okay.

22

MR. MEANS:

Submit it, please.

23

MR. JOHNSON:

There wasn't a

They continued their,

Anything else?

The state would submit it
COURT'S RULING

24
25

And then they started

THE JUDGE:

Okay.

We don't have a transcript
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1

of either the preliminary hearing or the suppression

2

hearing.

3

make my decision, in addition to the tape and EXHIBIT #1

4

from November 21st, '07 which would be the suppression

5

hearing is my guess.

6

the evidentiary hearing on the suppression motion, and then

7

the preliminary hearing was on October 10th.

Yes.

That was, November 21st was

And from the suppression hearing we learned that

8
9

But I've got my notes out and from those notes I

the interview took place at the Lehi Police Department.

10

That the defendant had been picked up by Lehi on other

11

charges.

12

that hearing thought that the defendant had his handcuffs,

13

had handcuffs on him.

14

not.

15

and he also opens his own can of Mountain Dew when they

16

bring in to him.

17

clearly in custody.

He was in custody.

The officer at that time at

Very clearly the DVD tells us he did

He reaches across, he shakes hands with the officer,

18

So he's clearly not handcuffed, but he's

And the officer tells him because you're in

19

custody we need to do your rights.

20

Officer Moosman, M-O-O-S-M-A-N, and the defendant are seated

21

across from each other at a table.

22

in the way so we can't always see the defendant's hands

23

clearly.

24

there's something else I couldn't identify that was to the

25

left.

They are

There are some things

I think the can of pop is there and a cup and

But nevertheless there was enough I could see what
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1

was going on.

2

All right.

I think with that I can go to my notes

3

from the DVD.

4

been supplied by a, Officer Moosman and it is a, a DVD of the

5

entire, I guess of the entire a, interview.

6

a, the initial portion that dealt with the issue here today.

7

I did not watch the entire thing.

8
9
10

And the DVD that we're talking about has

I only watched

The defendant made a few preliminary statements to
the officer.

He was talking about a, his friend Josh who

had died, said that a, at...

11

And there seems to be a disparity in the times on

12

the rights admonition waiver and the clock on the, the a,

13

DVD.

14

that it was signed at 14:40, and the clock is running

15

starting at 13:36.

16

on the DVD recorder must be an hour off.

17

great concern to me but just for the record that's why the

18

time on the EXHIBIT #1 and the time, the times that I give

19

are going to be different.

The time on the rights admonition the officer put

So I think the

clock must be, the clock
So it's not of

20

The a, so the defendant comes in and shakes hands

21

at 13:36, so that would be 1:26 in the afternoon on the DVD

22

clock.

23

with his mom.

24

Josh that broke his heart.

25

uniformed officer brings in a Mountain Dew for him.

He's crying, he talks about how he's had a fight
A minute later he's talking about his friend
And then at that point a
Talks
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1

about how his mom has accused him of stealing a, I believe

2

some pills, I couldn't tell exactly what it was, it sounded

3

like maybe it was Adderall that he had taken, he said he had

4

taken five or six pills.
At a, 13:37:50 the officer tells him he just wants

5
6

to talk to him about Josh.

7

basic paraphrases.

8

go through your rights with you.

9

reads to the defendant you do have the right to remain

10

And he, and all my quotes are

Because you've been arrested I need to
And so at 13:38:10 he

silent and asks him do you understand that?

1 1 across and hands the defendant a pen.

He reaches

And the defendant

12

says I can just read this.

And he points kind of back over

13

his shoulder and says he just read me my rights, and he says

14

that at 13:38:17. And the officer says if you'll read it,

15

or something like if you read it, if you understand it put

16

your initial by it.

17

time he wrote on the document was at 13:38:21, and I'm

18

assuming that was his first initial.

And from what I could see the first

And then he continues to talk about his

19

stepmother

20

and his mom.

21

while he is putting his initials on the page.

22

initial or the second writing that he did occurred at

23

13:38:29.

24

the fourth initial happens at 13:39:03.

25

And all of this conversation comes from him
The second

And the a, third initial happens at 13:38:36. And

Now, through all of this he's talking about his
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1

stepmother, he's talking about his mom selling the house to

2

them, which I would assume would be his stepmother and his

3

dad, and how they turned around and sold it for 400,000, and

4

the selling price had been 175, and they were supposed to

5

give his mom cash but they turned around and sold it for

6

400,000.

7

fourth set of initials at 13:39:03.
And then the officer shows him another something

8
9

And then he stops momentarily before he signs the

that he should read.

My assumption is that if we're going

10

down in order it would to be the middle paragraph that says,

11

If you decide to answer questions now

12

without a lawyer/attorney present you

13

will still have the right to stop

14

answering questions at any time.

15

also have the right to stop answering at

16

any time until you've talked to a

17

lawyer/attorney.

18

Of course, that's just an assumption I'm making

You

19

assuming that he went down in an order and signed sentences

20

one, two, three, four which are the basic Miranda warnings,

21

and then signed next to the paragraph.

22

of knowing that.

I don't have any way

But the officer tells him to read something in

23
24

addition and then to sign, and that's at at 13:39 I

25

think :08.
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And the defendant continues to talk but while he's

1
2

talking he does take the pen across the page as if he's

3

following the words.

4

just kind of what it looked like.

5

13:39:59.
Oh,

6

But I don't know that for sure, it's
That happens at

and he did, he did initial, after the officer

7

told him to read something and then sign he did initial

8

something for the fifth time at the 13:39:33. And then he

9

continues to talk, takes the pen across the page as if he's

10

following the words.
And then he initials while he's talking about his

11
12

dad, the sixth initial.

Is that right?

Yes.

He initials

13

the next I assume, possibly the next paragraph while he's

14

talking about how his dad kicked him out of the house.

15

And that's at the 13:40:13 right after the officer says just

16

sign right here.
At 13:40:16 the officer asks the defendant if he

17
18

understands everything and says if you do then sign right

19

there and the officer says he'll sign as a witness.

20

that's at 13:40:25. And at that point the defendant I guess

21

would sign his full name down where it says signature under

22

the last paragraph, Waiver of Rights.

23

after that the officer takes it back and then signs it

24

himself.

25

officer really wanted to talk about.

And

And then shortly

And they go right into the discussion of what the
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Now, I'm satisfied with the standard that's

1
2

outlined in the defense memo that I must look at the totality

3

of the circumstances and whether the defendant has knowingly

4

and voluntarily, and from another case intelligently, and

5

I'm sure intentionally as well, waived the right to remain

6

silent and to forego the advice of counsel prior to an

7

in-custody interrogation.

8

waiver must be clear and unambiguous as well as voluntary.

9

And that the standard I'm using is preponderance of the

10

I'm also satisfied that the

evidence.
The concern that I have with how this was handled

11
12

is that the defendant, as he is supposedly signing a document

13

this important, is clearly distracted and his mind on other

14

things.

15

Now, it was tempting to place the responsibility

16

on the defendant and say hey, this is the way he chose to do

17

it, he was satisfied, he felt like he knew what he was doing,

18

he was happy to keep talking while he read this document, a,

19

he said he had just had his rights read to him by another

20

officer, and place the burden on him to do it right.

21

But I don't think the case law does that.

And

22

the case that's cited by the defense, the Snider case which

23

is State of Utah versus Barry Snyder 860 P.2d 351 I believe

24

makes it clear that whatever the background is that it has

25

to still be a very clear advisement of rights with a very
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clear understanding.

If the lawyer is not up to it based

on the background, or a police officer is not up to handling
it himself based on his background, then a defendant
certainly is not.
The problem here is that the defendant's attention
was very clearly divided.

And I have nothing before me that

persuades me that he paid absolute attention to what he
was doing.

Everything I have persuades me he did not.

The officer should have stopped him and said don't talk, we
need to do this right, and the officer didn't do that.
And so the officer allowed the defendant to prattle on
about other things that not even the officer was interested
in.

Stealing pills from his stepmother was not the reason

that the defendant was there.

And frankly, there's some

concern that he's admitting to possibly stealing pills in the
middle of a Miranda warning and so that doesn't help
either.

The officer should have stopped him and said wait a

minute, you might be admitting a crime here and let's get
through your Miranda rights first.
beginning.

That happens at the very

And then he was onto the other family issues.
But I am not persuaded by what I saw on the DVD

that the defendant could have made a knowing, intelligent,
voluntary, intentional waiver of his right to remain silent,
his knowledge that anything he said could and would be used
against him in a court of law, that he was giving up his
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1

right to an attorney, to speak with an attorney and have an

2

attorney present, and that he had a right to have one

3

appointed.
The fact that he seemed to pay some attention to

4
5

the paper is not, is not persuasive.

6

at the end when the officer asked him if he understands

7

everything and he indicates he does, based on his attention

8

to the matter before him I'm not persuaded by the

9

preponderance of the evidence that this was a knowing waiver

10

And even the fact that

of his rights under the Miranda case.
So I grant the motion and find that he did not

11
12

make the necessary knowing, intelligent, voluntary and

13

intentional waiver of his Miranda rights and I suppress

14

anything that came after that from that particular

15

interview.
As to any other information the state has, it's not

16
17

affected, but as to this interview it is.
So a, Mr. Means I'll ask you to do the appropriate

18
19

findings, conclusion and order.
And where do the parties want to go from here on

20
21
22
23

this case?
MR. JOHNSON:

Can we set it on further proceedings

on the next date—

24

THE JUDGE:

25

MR. JOHNSON:

Same date?
—

set for sentencing, February

PAfiF ?4

1

6th.

2

THE JUDGE:

Is that okay?

3

MR. MEANS:

That works for us too, Judge.

4

THE JUDGE:

All right.

He's actually still at a

5

waiver hearing, I'm sorry, at arraignment.

6

preliminary, let me see, has he ever entered his pleas?
MR. JOHNSON:

7
8

Yes.

Since he's had a

October 17th he pled not

guilty, Your Honor.
THE JUDGE:

9

All right.

10

pretrial.

11

we'll take it from there.

So actually we're at

So we'll call that February 6th a pretrial and

12

MR. JOHNSON:

13

THE JUDGE:

Can we do that at 8:30?
Yes, we'll do it at 8:30 with the

14

other sentencing, at sentencings.

15

MR. JOHNSON:

16

THE JUDGE:

All right.

17

MR. MEANS:

Thank you, Your Honor.

18

THE JUDGE:

Now, do the parties want me to keep

Thank you.
Thank you very much.

19

these two items of evidence and have my clerk put them in as

20

evidence from his hearing?

21

MR. JOHNSON:

22

THE JUDGE:

23
24
25

That's fine.
We can just put them in an envelope

and leave them in the file.
MR. JOHNSON:

Yes.

If we can just do that, the

state has got its own copies.

PAtTF ?R

1

THE JUDGE:

2

MR. JOHNSON:

3

THE JUDGE:

4
5

Okay.
Thank you, Your Honor.
So I'll ask you to put these two in an

envelope, separate envelope in the file.
WHEREUPON, the hearing was concluded.
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
vs.

DISTRICT No. 071402713
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS
OF LAW, and ORDER SUPPRESSING
DEFENDANT'S ADMISSIONS

GARETH BOZUNG,
Defendant.

Hon. Claudia Laycock

This matter came on for oral argument on Defendant's Motion to Suppress
Statement on the 23rd day of January, 2008. This Court, having reviewed the parties'
written memoranda and the CD recording of the subject interview and having given due
consideration to the arguments of the parties, now enters these:

FINDINGS OF FACT
1. On 1 May, 2007 Defendant was arrested and retained in custody by Lehi City
Police officers on charges unrelated to this case.
2. Detective Moosman of the Highland-Alpine Police Department interviewed
Defendant at the Lehi City Police Department while Defendant remained in custody.
3. The entire interview was visually and audibly recorded. A CD disk recording of
the interview has been admitted into evidence. From such recording the following
sequence of events is apparent to this Court.
4. When Defendant entered the interview room he appeared distraught and
concerned about unrelated personal family matters.
5. Det. Moosman engaged Defendant briefly about such family matters; another
officer brought Defendant a Mountain Dew to drink; Defendant was not handcuffed or
otherwise physically restrained; Defendant and Det. Moosman sat across from each
other at a table.
6. Before beginning the interrogation, Det. Moosman told Defendant that it was
necessary to go through his rights with him and explained "right here you do have the
right to remain silent, do you understand?"
7. Defendant responded "yea."
8. Det. Moosman passed Defendant a document and asked Defendant to initial
"number 1 saying you under stand that." The document that Det. Moosman was
2

referring to was the waiver of rights form that has been made an exhibit in the file of this
matter; the form does include written admonitions of all the rights that are required by
Miranda v Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
9. Defendant accepted the form and said "I can just read it, he just read me my
rights."
10. Det. Moosman responded, "ok, that's fine, if you'll just read 'em and if you
understand 'em if you'll initial 'em."
11. From this point forward Det. Moosman did not advise Defendant of his
further rights but allowed Defendant to apparently read the form and place his initials
beside certain paragraphs in sequences that are uncertain to this Court.
12. Simultaneous with Defendant's handling the form, he and Det. Moosman
continued to discuss matters unrelated to Defendant's constitutional rights including,
the sale of Defendant's family home, the soaring price of homes, a family dispute
concerning Defendant's use of his mother's prescription drugs, the fact that his father
feels he is selfish, that he has been kicked out of his house for his language, that he
hadn't use, (drugs) that day, and that a "kid" he met last night told him he doesn't use,
he only smokes weed and drinks beer. Defendant did not stop talking about these
unrelated issues during the entire time he looked over the form.
13. While Defendant handled the form and simultaneously talked about the
subjects noted above, Det. Moosman interjected, "sign right here", "now do you under
3

stand all this stuff?", "and if you understand and agree with it, sign there ... and I'll sign
as a witness".
14. This Court is unable to determine from the written form, the CD recording, or
the testimony elicited at the preliminary examination in what sequence Defendant
initialed the various places where his initials appear on the form, or whether Defendant
actually read the various admonitions on the form, much less whether Defendant
comprehended any of the admonitions.
15. It is clear to this Court that Defendant did not focus exclusively on the
admonitions written on the form.
16. It is clear to this Court that Defendant was distracted from the admonitions
on the form by the matters about which he spoke with Det. Moosman.
17. It appears to this Court that Defendant signed the form voluntarily.
18. This Court is unable to determine from the evidence that if Defendant was in
fact previously advised of his Miranda rights, who so advised him, whether such
admonitions were adequately recited to Defendant, whether Defendant understood
each of such rights, or whether Defendant voluntarily and knowingly waived each of
such rights.
Upon the foregoing, this Court now enters these :

4

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. By a preponderance of evidence, this Court concludes that Det. Moosman did
not read from the form to Defendant or otherwise verbally advise Defendant that
anything Defendant said would be used against him in court, that Defendant had a right
to have an attorney present during questioning, or that questioning would cease if
Defendant asked it to cease or asked for an attorney.
2. This Court is not persuaded, by a preponderance of evidence, that Defendant,
by his own reading of the written waiver of rights form, was adequately advised that
anything he said would be used against him in court, that he had a right to have an
attorney present during questioning, or that questioning would cease if he asked it to
cease or asked for an attorney.
3. This Court is not persuaded, by a preponderance of evidence, that prior to the
interview by Det. Moosman, Defendant was previously adequately advised of his
Miranda rights by other police officers, that Defendant understood each of such rights,
or that Defendant voluntarily and knowingly waived each of such rights.
4. This Court is not persuaded, by a preponderance of evidence, that Defendant
knowingly waived his right to the presence of an attorney, that he was aware that his
statements would be use against him in court, or knew that he could stop the
interrogation at any time.
Upon the foregoing, this Court now enters this:
5

O 4

ORDER
It is hereby ordered that all of Defendant's statement made to Alpine-Highland
Det. Moosman on or about 1 May, 2007 at the Lehi City Police Department be and
hereby is suppressed and shall not be admitted as evidence at the trial of this matter.
Dated this

day of Y-OoYu^jr^
>H**f>X,^

, 2008.
By the Court:

Q

Claudia* LaycoGk^f;
Fourtl\|Bdicia||PiBti1ct Court
Approved as to form:

Craig dhm
Deputy Utah County Attorney
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P-R-O-C-E-E-D-I-N-G-S
(February 6, 200)
THE JUDGE:

Mr. Means is lying in wait there and I

just wondered.
MR. MEANS:

(Short inaudible, away from m i c ) .

THE JUDGE:

Was that your trash or move your

crap?
MR. JOHNSON:

(Short inaudible, away mic) never

wants it.
MR. MEANS:

Trash.

THE JUDGE:

And you are calling?

MR. MEANS:

Gareth Bozung.

THE JUDGE:

We don't know how the computer didn't

put his sentencings on but I caught it yesterday when I went
through so...
MR. MEANS:

Yes, we anticipated it.

He's number

three and then the add-ons, six, seven and eight.
THE JUDGE:

Right.

Where do you want to start?

MR. MEANS:

Wherever you want to start,

Your Honor.
THE JUDGE:

Let's start with number three.

Are

you two ready to discuss the defendant's motion, or I'm
sorry, the state's motion for rehearing or does the state
want an opportunity to reply before we discuss that?
MR. JOHNSON:

We can discuss that, Your Honor.

PAGE 3

1
2

THE JUDGE:

Okay.

How about you?

to discuss that, Mr. Means?

3

MR. MEANS:

We can.

4

THE JUDGE:

Go ahead, Mr. Johnson.

5

Are you ready

It's your

motion.

6

STATE'S MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION

7

ARGUMENT BY MR. JOHNSON

8

MR. JOHNSON:

The feels that in light of the

9

ruling that a, the court made note of the lack of evidence

10

that the state presented with respect to the prior Miranda

11

warnings the defendant was allegedly given by other Lehi

12

officers on another case and we failed to make a complete

13

record for the court a, to go to its ruling that a, we should

14

be afforded the opportunity to put that evidence on and then

15

the court can, we could brief that issue, the court could

16

still make the same ruling.

17

a, should we decide to take it up anywhere else.

18

THE JUDGE:

Okay.

That way we have a full record

Tell me how under either the

19

civil rules or the crime rules of procedure you get a second

20

bite of the apple.

21

MR. JOHNSON:

It's more of a, more of a court of

22

equity I guess that we're asking for, Your Honor.

23

see any other way, as Mr. Means points out.

24

a,—

25

THE JUDGE:

I don't

But a, that's

Since, frankly my concern,

PAGE 4

1

Mr. Johnson, is that what you want me to do is give the

2

state a second chance on a hearing that was set and on

3

arguments that were made, and after hearing my ruling and

4

realizing the state didn't cover everything the state wants a

5

second chance.

6

procedure do we do this?

7

we don't do it with preliminary hearings.

8

my recollection is on the case law on preliminary hearings

9

you don't get to file again and you don't get a second shot

10

Now, in what other hearing or what other
We don't do it with jury trials,
I'm pretty sure,

unless there's newly discovered evidence.

11

MR. JOHNSON:

And admittedly it's a unique

12

situation, Your Honor, and that's why we just in consulting

13

the attorney general's office a, thought that this was the

14

best thing to make sure that we got a record of a, one way or

15

the other and a, want to proceed in this manner.

16

THE JUDGE:

The attorney general's office thinks

17

that there's a legitimate way other than my being kind and

18

equitable for you to get a second hearing?

19
20
21
22
23

MR. JOHNSON:
that.

I didn't get any more direction than

No, Your Honor.
THE JUDGE:

Okay.

Mr. Means?

ARGUMENT BY MR. MEANS
MR. MEANS:

Well, I think the discussion that a,

24

at the bench that counsel had is exactly on point as to what

25

I would argue and have argued in my response.

I can

T>»

7\ n n

r

1

understand why the attorney general wants there to be a

2

record made.

3

like it to be better.

4

procedural vehicle to do that.

5

right that a, that there's, there's no newly discovered

6

evidence, there's nothing that would justify reopening it.

7

The state mentioned that they wanted to have a chance to put

8

that in, they had that chance, it wasn't put in.

9

your ruling was proper under the evidence you were given, and

10

I think that's all we're saying is we'd sure
But I don't think that there is any
I think you're absolutely

I think

I don't see that there's a procedure to continue to reopen

1 1 things and try to put on more evidence.
12

So I've made my argument in my response.

13

THE JUDGE:

14

MR. JOHNSON:

Mr. Johnson?

The state would submit
COURT'S RULING

15
16

Anything else?

THE JUDGE:

All right.

Well, I've read both of

17

the memoranda.

And a, I think Mr. Means is correct when he

18

says the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure do not

19

specifically provide for a motion for a rehearing.

20

number two he said the state is seeking a reconsideration.

21

Generally the motions for reconsideration that I see, which

22

I turn down as often as I possibly can because they are

23

frowned upon by the appellate courts and there is no place

24

for them in the rules of procedure, generally such motions

25

to reconsider are based on maybe newly discovered case law

And

T-l 7\ / T 1

tZ

that they didn't find before.

But even then they are

generally not filed with an attempt to supplement the
factual record.

And that is exactly what the state wants

to do here is now bring in more facts, have an opportunity
to put on another officer to testify and bolster the state's
claim that the Miranda rights were carefully given and
unlawfully given.
This is nothing more than a second bite at the
apple having heard my ruling and a, my conclusion that the a,
there was no evidence put on by the state that showed that
he had recently received good Miranda warnings from another
officer that might have possibly saved what I perceived to
be very poor Miranda warnings in this case.
And I agree with Mr. Means on his number three, a,
his third point that the closest would be, the closest
analogous procedure would be a motion for a new trial.
But that evidence could have been put on by the
state at

that time.

Certainly with reasonable diligence

they could have had the officer there and they should have
thought of that.

This is nothing new, nothing stunning,

nothing that I certainly didn't think about as I prepared
for that hearing.
And so I deny the motion.

I think that the state

is going to have to stand on the record as it is if they want
to take this up on appeal.

PAGE 7

All right.

1
2

So I deny the motion for a rehearing,

ask Mr. Means to prepare an order.

3

And where do you want to go from there?

4

MR. JOHNSON:

The state would like some time to

5

file its a, get with the AG's Office and file its brief to a,

6

to appeal the ruling.
THE JUDGE:

7
8

Okay.

So do it on an interloc

without dismissing first?
MR. JOHNSON:

9

Yes, that would be ideal.

In the

10

meantime I guess the state can review, Mr. Means has provided

11

us with a copy of the proposed order and findings of fact

12

from—
THE JUDGE:

13
14
15
16

From last week or from two weeks

ago?
MR. JOHNSON:

Yes.

If we can have a week to

review those and a, a,—

17

THE JUDGE:

18

MR. JOHNSON:

All right.
—

contact the court, file an

19

objection if we want.

20

court order and then we'll take that up.

21

THE JUDGE:

Otherwise we'll submit it and have the

Okay.

So it doesn't slip through the

22

cracks let's do this.

23

the status of the case on March 12th at 1:30.

24

MR. JOHNSON:

25

THE JUDGE:

I want to put it on for a review as to

Okay.
And at that time hopefully by then

T-» 7\ /T"i

O

1

the orders are signed.

2

call off the hearing.

If the orders are signed then we can

3

MR. JOHNSON:

Okay.

4

THE JUDGE:

If not you guys can tell me what's

5

going on.

6

MR. JOHNSON:

7

THE JUDGE:

Thank you, Your Honor.
All right.

Okay.

That takes us to

8

the sentencing.

9

receive the a, memo, the PV report signed by Darrell Healy

10

I have three files here.

and Daniel Lanchard as well as the updated PSI?

11

MR. JOHNSON:

12

MR. MEANS:

13

THE JUDGE:

14

The state, the state has.
The defendant did.
Okay.

Thank you.

So everybody is

ready to roll?

15

MR. MEANS:

I think so

16

SENTENCING

17

DISCUSSION BY MR. MEANS

18
19

Did the parties

THE JUDGE:

Okay.

Mr. Means, would you like to

address those documents?

20

MR. MEANS:

Yes, Judge.

First of all, let me

21

just point out that whichever sentence you intend to impose

22

I believe that the correct credit for time served is 180

23

days, 189 days.

24

him appearing on January 23rd, which we did but it was

25

continued.

It's, their recommendation is based upon

PAGE 9

THE JUDGE:

1
2

had.

3

you're saying.

And I added 14 days on to what they

I thought I came up with something different than what
Let me look.

4

MR. MEANS:

Oh,

5

THE JUDGE:

They had 162 days and then I added 14

6

and that was 176.
MR. MEANS:

7
8

actually—

Looking at page five they gave him

credit for 13 days on one case and 1 6 2 —

9

THE JUDGE:

Right.

10

MR. MEANS:

—

11

THE JUDGE:

Right.

12

MR. MEANS:

So I'm saying—

13

THE JUDGE:

So most, on two of the cases he gets

14

on the other.

176, on one of the cases he gets a —

15

MR. MEANS:

189.

16

THE JUDGE:

Was it 13?

MR. MEANS:

Oh,

20

THE JUDGE:

Separately per case.

21

MR. MEANS:

As long as you see to give him credit

23

THE JUDGE:

Yes.

24

MR. MEANS:

17

thought.

18
19

22

25

13 plus 14 would be 27 I

I see what you're doing.

All

right.

for—

—

for the time in whatever fashion

you do it is fine.

f\ TV < T n

1

f\

1

THE JUDGE:

Okay.

2

MR. MEANS:

The additions to his matrix in points

3

that the department made were that a, he was on pretrial

4

release when these three matters occurred, when they were

5

committed.

6

before the court on the matter you just heard, number three

7

on the calendar, and that occurred in March and he appeared

8

before any of these occurred.

9

before any of these were charged.

That's correct.

He was actually first brought

He appeared on that case

10

THE JUDGE:

Okay.

11

MR. MEANS:

So I think they're correct in giving

12
13

him those points.
They've also given him points for a DUI which

14

occurred in 2004 in Salt Lake City which is listed as case

15

number 045004875.

16

THE JUDGE:

You're on p a g e —

17

MR. MEANS:

Six.

18

THE JUDGE:

Dated 6-20-04?

19

MR. MEANS:

Uh-huh (affirmative).

20

THE JUDGE:

Okay.

21

MR. MEANS:

I've actually looked that up on the

22
23

It's the sixth entry.

state's computer and don't find that number.
MR. JOHNSON:

And I have a copy of the docket that

24

I got Midvale to send me because it was unclear from the

25

criminal history.

p&m? 11

THE JUDGE:

1
2

number?

3

MR. JOHNSON:

4

THE JUDGE:

5

MR. JOHNSON:

6

THE JUDGE:

7

Uh-huh (affirmative).
Yes.
Okay.

MR. JOHNSON:

Have you shown that to

I have not.

I've shown it to the

AP&P.
THE JUDGE:

10
11

045004875?

Mr. Means?

8
9

So does it have that same case

I'm just curious.

Is it really for

DUI and reckless driving?

12

MR. JOHNSON:

It says local, local ordinance D U I —

13

THE JUDGE:

14

MR. JOHNSON:

15

THE JUDGE:

Oh really?

16

MR. MEANS:

Two points, Judge.

Okay.
—

/reckless driving.
/reckless driving?
This is a Midvale

17

justice court and that's why it's probably not in the

18

computer and a —

19
20
21

THE JUDGE:

All right.

So that looks like it's

MR. MEANS:

It notes a DUI was dismissed, wrong

good.

22

way on a one-way street was dismissed.

23

license was dismissed.

24

reckless driving ordinance, guilty.

25

saying reckless driving.

Never obtained

And then it says local DUI and
I think that's a way of

Defendant remembers it as being a

PAGF 1 ?

1

reckless driving.

2

THE JUDGE:

Okay.

3

MR. MEANS:

So with that proof then I suppose

4

those points are correct.

5

THE JUDGE:

All right.

6

MR. MEANS:

My a, central argument with regard to

7

what the, in opposition to what the department has

8

recommended is essentially the same as my motion that the

9

court consider entering, or entering his conviction on

10

Count 1 of case number 2801 which was a first degree felony

11

as a second degree felony under Rule 402.

12

those together.

13

on the three matrixes we've got according to the points that

14

he has.

15

I'll just address

It's properly scored, it's properly placed

Nevertheless, I would argue that this court should

16

enter the conviction on the first degree felony as a second

17

degree felony for these reasons.

18

three matrixes, on the other two convictions he falls

19

clearly within probation and a, I would assume the court

20

would in a normal case grant him probation under those

21

circumstances.

22

If you look at all of the

In the case where he's convicted of a first degree

23

felony that, of course, puts him over into a category which

24

would call for 78 months, six and a half years of

25

incarceration as opposed to what would be a normal probation

DSOT

1 "3

1 with normal sentence of jail and supervision and treatment
2

on the other cases.
I don't see Gareth is different than every other

3
4

defendant that I represent with drug charges.

5

substantially similar.

6

in his life.

7

drugs in the first place that are illegal so they are, they

8

are wrong to use in the first place, these are

9

nonprescription drugs, he's used them more than he should

10

His history is

He's had periods of irresponsibility

He has no violence in his life.

and it's severely impacted his life.

1 1 almost everybody I stand with.

He's used

That given, that's

I don't see that a, his

12

position is any way unique from a, from other defendants that

13

I represent.
Even with regard to these charges he's the same

14
15

man standing in front of you.

16

within a four month period between March and August of last

17

year.

18

drug use, in another of these cases he's pled to a third for

19

his drug use, and in this case he was found guilty of a

20

first for his drug use.

21

same behavior, same a, general picture of who he is.

22

by choice of prosecution on how they want to handle it he

23

gets treated substantially more severely in one case than

24

the other two.

25

All of these charges occurred

In one of these cases he's pled to a second for his

Same person, same period of time,
Just

That's the prosecution's right.

But it's also the court's right to look at the
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1

overall picture of who he is, what is needed to rehabilitate

2

him, what's needed to address him for accountability

3

purposes.

4

need six and a half years of his life incarcerated.

5

certainly be dry for that period of time, or at least

6

hopefully be dry, I don't know what the prison what

7

he'd have.

8

citizen I don't need that bed space taken up for six and a

9

half years for someone with his pattern of behavior.

And frankly, as a citizen I don't see that I

And that's what we would achieve.

He'll

access

But as a

I think that, that this court should grant the

10

1 1 motion to lower that conviction to a second degree felony.
12

If you were to do so he would slide over to Column I rather

13

than Column E because it's a second degree possession only

14

crime.

15

degree possession only crime.

16

of the way the matrix is laid out, within the last couple

17

of years they've added two columns which were for possession

18

only.

19

degree felonies but not first degree felonies.

20

that's some indication of how the system generally wants to

21

address possession only charges.

22

differently, they are treated as something that is less

23

severe than if he were to act out against a person or against

24

a person's property.

25

and I think that that's why those two additional columns were

And I should note there is no such thing as a first
But by the general character

I think that in third degree felonies and second
And I think

They are treated

He's harming mainly himself.

And a,
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1

entered.
If he were over in Column I with the same points

2
3

that he has he'd be in probation on this case too.

I think

4

that's what's needed.

5

accountability.

6

on probation on two other cases in the past simultaneously,

7

one class A misdemeanor and his previous felony.

8

a period of six years.

9

the felony came near the end of his probation period on the

I think that, I think that meets

I think that meets rehabilitation.

He was

It was for

It was extended to six years because

10

misdemeanor so it was extended.

11

revoked and reinstated.

He tells me he was never

Am I correct?

12

THE DEFENDANT:

13

MR. MEANS:

Pretty sure.

I hope that's correct.

He tells me he

14

was never revoked and reinstated.

15

because of the new conviction.

16

unsuccessfully because at the end of the time period he

17

hadn't paid his fine in full.

18

THE DEFENDANT:

19

MR. MEANS:

It was simply extended
He was terminated

Am I correct?

Yes.

He's just not a person from past

20

history or from behavior in these cases that I think this

21

court needs or society needs to impose a sentence of that

22

severity.

23

motion to reduce it to a second degree felony and impose the

24

sanction accordingly.

25

And so I'm asking that the court consider our

As an alternative, if you don't think that's a
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1

proper ruling, I still think that the court could impose

2

probation based upon a first degree felony.

3

because that's what I think is called for in this case that

4

he be placed on probation.

5

felony hanging over his head.

6

violate probation knowing where he is right now then maybe he

7

would deserve a severe jail sentence by the court.

And he would have a first degree
If he were dumb enough to

In either alternative it's my argument that a, all

8
9

I, and, and

of the facts and all of the circumstances in this case call

10

for him to be placed on probation rather than be sentenced to

11

prison.
THE JUDGE:

12

Okay.

Before we go any further my

13

clerk had put in the file and I had forgotten it, we received

14

an ex parte letter, I've made copies for each of the parties

15

from I think a family member or someone.

16

you take a look at that before you conclude your

17

presentation, Mr. Means.
Anything else you want to say after reading that,

18
19

So I'll just let

Mr. Means?
MR. MEANS:

20

It just jogged my memory as to one

21

point.

He was denied a, referral to the Door Program and I,

22

if I read the report correct it was simply because the

23

recommendation and points and placement on the matrix

24

suggested a prison recommendation and so that's were he was

25

denied Door.

But I think he's a perfect candidate for, for
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1

that program.
THE JUDGE:

2
3

All right.

Mr. Bozung, anything you

want me to know?
THE DEFENDANT:

4

Yes. I had a problem with drugs

5

in my life.

I know I'm responsible for the actions I've

6

made and the choices I've made and I'm responsible for the

7

consequences.

8

probation.

9

better myself.

I believe I should have a chance on

I don't want this life anymore, I want to
I want to get rid of my drug addictions.

10

need tools to help me.

11

family of my own.

12

being in trouble and being addicted to drugs.

13

about it.
THE JUDGE:

15

Mr. Johnson?

17

I love my family, I want to have a

And I just I want to live life without

14

16

I

All right.

And that's

Thank you.

ARGUMENT BY MR. JOHNSON
MR. JOHNSON:

I think it's disingenuous to say

18

that the only person Mr. Bozung is hurting is himself when we

19

have a 2002 conviction for distribution basically of drugs.

20

You know, I think a, certainly Josh Rozeka's (phonetic)

21

family would disagree with that comment.

22

(inaudible word) probation and he's amenable to probation.

23

I mean, in his backpack where the drugs is found hand

24

warmers around a urine sample.

25

to beat urine tests, a, these kind of things that should be

Then we have

I mean, he's actively trying
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1

privileges on the outside if he doesn't want to be

2

incarcerated that he has to comply with probation instead of

3

trying to beat the system.
I think with his, his history and the current

4
5

offenses that he been convicted of a, you know, the jury,

6

the jury heard the evidence.

7

degree where it's at for a, for a reason.

8

the other cases Mr. Means mentions it's based on the

9

prosecution's discretion, I mean, those were plea bargains.

The legislature has set the
And a, you know,

10

I mean, they were charged as firsts as well.

And a, he took

11

advantage of a plea bargain.

12

selectively prosecuting one case or the other, but that was

13

something that was struck in the grand scheme of things after

14

the first degree felony case.

And so it's, we weren't just

So the state feels that the recommendation is

15
16

appropriate, the matrix as are is scored properly and that he

17

should go to prison
FURTHER COMMENT BY MR. MEANS

18

MR. MEANS:

19

Let me respond briefly, Judge.

None

20

of it matters much but I think it I would like to make a

21

record.

22

behavior just like Mr. Bozung is.

23
24
25

Mr. Rozeka (phonetic) is responsible for his own

THE JUDGE:
isn't in front of me.
MR. MEANS:

Well and frankly, folks, that case
Isn't that the other case?
It is the other case but—
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THE JUDGE:

1

And if you want to go ahead and

2

address that.

But my view is that I can't take that case

3

into consideration in sentencing him today.
MR. MEANS:

4

The other point I want to make,

5

Your Honor, is that his other pleas were pleas, they were

6

reduced by plea bargain.

7

brought up I will tell you that the offer that was made as a

8

global offer to him was is that he plea to at least one

9

first degree felony.

But as long as the matter was

So whether they were reduced or not a,

10

he was put in a position of either accepting the first

11

degree felony or going to trial, and that's why he went to

12

trial.

13

Again I say it doesn't matter much.

But my point

14

is still the same, a first degree felony is more than is

15

called for and his background and his behavior and what's

16

needed to rehabilitation and true accountability.

17
18
19

THE JUDGE:

Anything else?

Anyone

else wanting to be heard?
MR. JOHNSON:

The state will submit it
COURT'S RULING

20
21

All right.

THE JUDGE:

Okay.

Let me talk first about the

22

'07 case ending in 2801.

This is the case that was tried

23

to a verdict by a jury, and this is the case in which

24

Mr. Means has filed a motion to enter the judgment on the

25

next lower degree.
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1

I deny the motion.

I find that with his history

2

and for whatever reasons he went to trial on this matter and

3

it was a, tried well by both sides and the jury found him

4

guilty as charged.

5

And I agree with the prosecution.

This is where

6

the legislature has put this particular a, kind of a case.

7

Even though he wasn't dealing in this case, because of the

8

prior, and because of the drug-free zone, it ends up bumping

9

up to a first degree felony.

And that is the chance that

10

he and others in the same position take when they possess

11

Schedule-2 or Schedule-1 controlled substances, other than

12

marijuana is a Schedule-1.

13

the history and the character of the defendant and the

14

nature of this crime that a conviction on his record for a

15

first degree felony is appropriate.

16

And so I think that a, given

So I deny the motion to enter judgment in the next

17

lower degree on the first degree felony in the

18

ending in 2801 .

19
20
21

?

07 case

Let me next address the criminal history as found
in the amended, with two Ms report.
Turning to page six, having in mind also the

22

matrices, the three different matrices that have been

23

prepared by Adult Probation and Parole.

24

want to turn to one of the ones I've got all marked up.

25

Well, it depends on which report you're looking at, which

Hang on.

I just
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1

page it's on.

But let me see if I can get to the one.

2

I'm looking at page six on the report that covers the two

3

different cases, the 2801 case and the 3285 case.
As I look at his history in the adult record

4
5

starts in 2000.

6

misdemeanors and one felony.

7

was.

8

DUI, a Class A burglary.

9

vehicle burglary or something reduced down.

10

His juvenile history had at least nine
Don't know what the felony

Starting in 2000 when he turns 18 we have a Class B
So it must have been either
We have the

next item which is something that just totally befuddles me,

1 1 a tampering with evidence a Class C misdemeanor.
12

I don't

know how you get there.

13

MR. JOHNSON:

It's got a lot of attempts on it.

14

THE JUDGE:

15

have no clue what that's about.

That just makes no sense at all. I

Next we have a Class A attempted possession or use

16
17

of a controlled substance, so obviously a Schedule-2 that

18

was knocked down with an attempt from a felony.

19

Class A after that, attempted...

20

we have the one third degree felony in his history as an

21

adult engaging in criminal enterprises, and then it has in

22

parentheses a distribution of a controlled substance.

23

So from 2000 to 2002 he has some misdemeanors and one

24

felony.

25

out of a justice court that was apparently some sort of a

I'm sorry.

And a

This is where

In 2004 he has the case that we've discussed a,

D
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1

reckless driving or maybe a DUI under an ordinance, but the

2

record apparently also shows that the DUI was dismissed.

3

So it's reckless something.
And then we get to 2007 with the three cases that

4
5

are in front of me.

As I indicated I cannot take into

6

account anything that happened in the other case that was on

7

the calendar today.

8

I make my decision based on what I have in front of me, these

9

three cases and the criminal history.

It's not before me for sentencing.

As I look at these three cases the one and only

10
11

reason he's going, that the recommendation from AP&P is

12

prison is that there is one first degree felony.

13

anybody else given this same history would not have a

14

recommendation for prison.
MR. JOHNSON:

15
16

And

Otherwise

Your Honor, if I might note he had

two successful probations that are listed there.

17

THE JUDGE:

18

MR. JOHNSON:

19

THE JUDGE:

I saw them.
Okay.
And one of them I think they indicated

20

the problem was he didn't keep a job and he had more problems

21

with controlled substances, and I can't remember the other

22

thing.

Was it failure to report?

23

MR. JOHNSON:

24

THE JUDGE:

25

here.

I think so.
I'm going off the top of my head

It was there in one of the reports.

Anyway, there
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1

were three reasons that were given, not just that he didn't

2

pay the fines as he claimed.

3

Given all of that and the fact that on two of these

4

matrices he ends up in the intermediate sanctions and on the

5

third he ends up in the imprisonment category.
Possibly against my better judgment and definitely

6
7

against the wishes of the state and AP&P, Mr. Bozung, I'm

8

going to give you one last chance.

9

you to prison this time.

10

I'm not going to send

You're going to be on probation

on these three cases.
Now, you have to go into this probation knowing

11
12

that AP&P didn't want you, and twice now they've told me they

13

don't want you.

They stuck to their original a,

14

recommendation.

They actually went back and looked at the

15

matrices very carefully and found more points against you.

16

But I'm going to give you the chance.

17

THE DEFENDANT:

18

THE JUDGE:

Thank you.

There is one other thing, counsel,

19

that I wrote myself a note on, and I'm, nobody argued it.

20

But my understanding has always been that the date of a

21

conviction is the date of sentencing, not the date of entry

22

of plea.

23

because they're doing these dates of conviction and adding

24

up the points on the matrices as the date that he entered

25

his plea.

And I'm not so sure that they're doing it right,

But for all other purposes a, the date of

PAGE 24

1

conviction is always considered to be the date that the

2

conviction is truly entered and that doesn't happen until

3

sentencing.
MR. MEANS:

May I address that, Your Honor, just

6

THE JUDGE:

Uh-huh (affirmative).

7

MR. MEANS:

I did look at that and I think that it

4
5

briefly?

8

makes a difference in points but not a difference in his

9

level.

10

THE JUDGE:

Okay.

Well, and it didn't in the end

1 1 make a difference in how I viewed the case. And I've thought
12

about this a great deal.

13

great deal of time looking at this while the jury was out so

14

that I understood what they had done.

15

I've looked at this and spent a

And I am, Mr. Bozung, looking at this in a global

16

manner as suggested by your attorney.

17

you come back and you blow probation that we'll look at it in

18

a global manner again and say you're gone.

19

THE DEFENDANT:

20

THE JUDGE:

But it also means if

Okay?

I know.

So if, I think you've watched me long

21

enough that you know it's not hollow threats.

And I'll, if

22

you don't do well I'll send you up.

23

THE DEFENDANT:

24

THE JUDGE:

25

So on each of these cases let's do the maximums.

I know that.

I'm not going to have much choice.
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On 071403285, Count 1 was reduced to third degree

1
2

felony.

I'll order that you serve no more than five years in

3

the Utah State Prison.

4

that case as I recall.

And that's the only conviction in

On the '07 case ending in 1958 I'm looking at the

5
6

second amended information.

On Count 2, possession or use

7

of a controlled substance with a prior conviction, a third

8

degree felony, that's the meth charge, you entered a guilty

9

plea.

I will order that you, and that was a second degree

10

felony.

I will order that you serve not less than one but

11

not more than 15 years in the Utah State Prison.
On Count 3, obstructing justice, that was reduced

12
13

to a third, I'll order no more than five years in the Utah

14

State Prison.

15

And Count 4, possession of drug paraphernalia in a

16

drug-free zone, a Class A misdemeanor, I will order that you

17

serve one year, 365 days in the Utah County Jail.
I will run those concurrent within the case.

18
19

I will run them consecutive to the first case.
And on the '07 case ending in 2801 the jury found

20
21

you guilty of possession or use of cocaine, a controlled

22

substance, in a drug-free zone.

23

form.

24

just leave that off the verdict form?

25

But

I'm looking at the verdict

It doesn't have the prior conviction on it.

MR. JOHNSON:

Yes, because we did.

Did we

We bifurcated

P
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1

it.
THE JUDGE:

2

Okay.

Oh,

that's right.

3

bifurcated.

4

Okay.

5

felony.

6

but it may be life on that charge.

Because we

All of a sudden I thought oh,

With a prior conviction.

stop.

So it's a first degree

I will order that you serve not less than five years

And then on the Class A misdemeanor drug

7
8

paraphernalia charge in a drug-free zone I will order that

9

you serve 365 days in the Utah County Jail.

10
11

And I will run those concurrently with each other
within the case but consecutive to the other two cases.
So as you can see I'm trying to make the stakes

12
13
14

high so that you'll hang in there.

While I've got my clerk at that case I'll work

15

backwards.

16

$700 and a surcharge of 595.

17

that right.

18

Okay?

On 2801 I will order fines in the amount of

$595.

Oh,

let me make sure I did

And court security fees of $50.

On the '07 case ending in 1958 I will order that

19

you pay a fine in the amount of $600, and a surcharge of

20

$510, and one, two, three court security fees of $75.

21

And in the '07 case ending in 3285 I will order

22

that you pay fines in the amount of $500, $425 surcharge,

23

and a $25 court security fee.

24
25

I will stay the maximum terms on all three cases,
place you on probation supervised by Adult Probation and
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1

Parole for a period of 36 months.

During that 36 month

2

period you're to obey all laws state, local and federal,

3

report to the court and Adult Probation and Parole whenever

4

required, and keep your address current with the court and

5

AP&P at all times.
As to the jail time in each case I'm going to

6
7

order that you serve 270 days in the Utah County Jail.

8

to keep things simple I'm going to order that you get 176

9

days credit in each case.

10

And

I'm going to order that you successfully complete

11

the Out program.

And given the fact that I've placed you on

12

probation, if AP&P can get around the guidelines that have

13

been set up and you are approved for the Door program I

14

will allow you to participate in the Door program.

15

you're not allowed in the Door program, any other treatment

16

program that AP&P orders you into I will order that you

And if

1 7 successfully complete, including its aftercare.
I will order that you will submit to any curfews

18
19

that they order.

And if they want you to do electronic

20

monitoring as part of their probation, not through the jail

21

but as part of their probation you will do electronic

22

monitoring.

23

will order that you have absolutely no alcohol, and that you

24

do not go to places where alcohol is the chief item of

25

order.

I will order that you maintain employment.

I

Obviously you can't have any illegal controlled

PACT
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1

substances.

2

anyway.
Is there anything in the standard order that I've

3
4

left out?
MR. JOHNSON:

5
6

That goes without saying but I'll say it

mentioned comply with substance abuse treatment.

7

THE JUDGE:

8

MR. JOHNSON:

9

THE JUDGE:

10

I don't know if I missed it, you

Yes, I did.
Thank you.
In the end there was no restitution on

the case at Cal Ranch was there, because they got everything

1 1 back?
12

MR. JOHNSON:

13

THE JUDGE:

14

the other cases that I recall.

15

MR. JOHNSON:

16

THE JUDGE:

That's accurate.
Okay.

And no restitution in any of

That's correct.
Okay.

I will order that within 24

17

hours of your release from the jail you report to AP&P in

18

person.

19

come out and see you before you leave.

20

it's your job to find them, it's not their job to find you.

21

So that means you need to have a, a place set up to live when

22

you get out.

No phone calls, in person.

THE DEFENDANT:

24

THE JUDGE:
Mr. Bozung.

Bottom line is,

Okay?

23

25

Hopefully they will

Yes, Your Honor.

Okay.

It's your call.

So it's in your lap,
Okay.

I hope you can pull

PAOF

?Q

1

it off.

I think you've done the ARC before and that's about

2

the only treatment opportunity that you've had or taken

3

advantage of.
You don't have to be ordered into treatment.

4
5

And I say that because of the letter that came in from your

6

family.

7

don't think it's a valid excuse to say I've never been

8

ordered into treatment.

9

know where you need to go.

10

Nobody has to order you into treatment.

12

You've got a drug problem, you
So please follow through.

would like to see you succeed.

1 1 unhappy today.

I

I've made a lot of people

So you know, be nice, prove me right.

Okay.

13

THE DEFENDANT:

14

MR. MEANS:

Thank you.

15

THE JUDGE:

Okay.

16

And I

Thank you, Your Honor.

WHEREUPON, the hearing was concluded.

17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
vs.

DISTRICT No. 071402713
ORDER IN RE:
STATE'S MOTION
FOR REHEARING

GARETH BOZUNG,
Defendant.

Hon. Claudia Laycock

This matter came on before this Court on the 6th day of February, 2007, for
argument on the State's Motion for Rehearing of the Order Suppressing Defendant's
Admissions. The State was represented by Craig Johnson, Deputy Utah County
Attorney. Defendant appeared personally and was represented by his attorney of
record, Thomas H. Means. Having duly considered the parties' written and oral
arguments, this Court now enters the following findings:
1. The Utah Rules of Criminal Proceduredio not specifically provide for a Motion
U
for Rehearing.

Q&

2. A Motion to Reconsider is not specifically provided for in the Utah Rules of
Criminal Procedure. Neither are such motions recognized in the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure1 {Watkiss & Campbell v FOB & Son, 808 P.2d 1061, 1064 (Utah, 1991)),
however they have been reviewed as if brought under some other proper rule and
simply mistitled. /of., at 1064-65.
3. The most closely appropriate rule of criminal procedure that would govern the
State's Motion for Rehearing on Suppression Motion would be Rule 24, Motion for New
Trial.
4. The Utah Supreme Court has addressed the standard to be used when a
party seeks to introduce additional evidence in support of a motion for new trial. Such
evidence "must be such as could not with reasonable diligence have been discovered
and produced at the trialf.]" State v James, 819 P.2d 781, 793 (Utah, 1991).
5. This Court determines, by a preponderance of evidence, that the State was
aware of the possible existence of witnesses who could have provided evidence relative
to Defendant having been advised of his Miranda rights prior to being interviewed by
Detective Moosman.

2

See Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 81(e) making the civil rules of procedure
applicable in criminal cases "where there is no other applicable statute or rule ...."
2

6. This Court is not persuaded, by a preponderance of evidence, that the State
could not have produced, with reasonable diligence, such witnesses or other evidence
relative to the issue at this Court's original hearing on 23 January, 2008.
Upon the foreaoing, this Court denies the State's Motion for Rehearing.
Dated this ±-L day of February, 2008.

^OfUj|^ dud[i6ial District
Approved as to form:

Craig |amnson
Deputy Utah County Attorney
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